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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent reports from the European Commission on European Union
price differentials for new motor vehicles reflect a steady narrowing of the
differences in prices for motor vehicles across the 27 Member States.'
Although the inclusion within the European Community in 2004 of ten new
countries with relatively homogeneous pricing has evidently colored these
findings,2 price differentials among the EU-15 appear to be decreasing.
3
Price convergence has been welcomed by consumer associations 4 and
* Lecturer in European Law, University of Glasgow. Ph.D., European University Institute,
Florence. LL.M., Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. The author would like to thank Dr.
Kathleen W. Johnson and Professor Christian C. Joerges for their valuable comments. All
errors are mine alone.
Since 1993, the Commission has regularly published biannual reports on car price
differentials in May and November. See Europa, Car Price Reports Archive,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/motor-vehicles/prices/archive.html (last
visited Nov. 25, 2007); see also Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Frank Verboven, EU Car
Prices: Cross-Country Price Dispersion in the Euro Era: A Case Study of the European Car
Market, 2004 ECON. POL'Y 483.
2 By "new members" reference is made to the ten countries which entered the European
Union on May 1, 2004: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. In addition, Romania and Bulgaria joined on
January 1, 2007.
3 The latest Commission report on price differentials shows price convergence. European
Comm'n, Car Price Report: Annex (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors
/motorvehicles/prices/2006_l 1.b.pdf.
4 BEUC, the European Consumers' Organisation, has shown a particular concern for
price differentials. BEUC is "representative ... of 33 independent national consumer
associations from countries of the EU, EEA, and elsewhere in Europe." Bureau Europ6en
des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC), Position Paper: Reaction to Andersen Consulting
Study on the Impact of Possible Future Legislative Scenarios for Motor Vehicle Distribution
on all Parties Concerned, 2 Doc. BEUC/X/008 (Jan. 31, 2002).
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European institutions, which for many years fought arduously to force car
manufacturers to reduce these differentials. The justification for their
concerns was based on a logical argument. In the 1950s, European nations
initiated a progressive process of integration which ripened over the years
into a single market-the European Union's pride and primary objective.5
Car price differentials questioned the very raison d 'tre of the emerging
Community, as they served to re-enhance national borders, which were
becoming progressively blurred by the steady elimination of barriers to
trade. The blame was subsequently put on distribution restraints-those
restrictions contained in distribution agreements between manufacturers and
their dealers. Territorial or customer allocation could be used-and
abused-to facilitate price discrimination as a consequence of the resulting
"segmentation" of the market for the product. What is more, according to
the Commission these restraints were being utilized to impede consumers
from shopping for their cars across national borders and from benefiting
from price differences. The Commission responded by penalizing those
manufacturers considered to be preventing their dealers from selling to
customers outside their allotted territories.
6
The decrease in price differentials coincides with a difficult moment in
the history of the European car industry. The long-established European car
manufacturers have been caught in a period of decline which, coupled with
5 The general aims of the Treaty are set out in Article 2, and are "to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities,
a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women,
sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence
of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the
environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States." Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 40 [hereinafter
EC Treaty], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E
_EN.pdf. For these purposes, Article 3 provides the means to achieve them. These include
"(c) an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital." Id.
6 Fines have been imposed, for instance, on Volkswagen, Opel, DaimlerChrysler, and
more recently, Peugeot. Commission Decision 98/273, 1998 O.J. (L 124) 60 (EC), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/1998/-i24/1-12419980425enOO600108
.pdf, Commission Decision 2001/711, 2001 O.J. (L 262) 14 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2001/1_262/1_26220011002en00140037.pdf (overruled
by Case T-208/01, Volkswagen AG v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-05141, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62001 A0208 :EN:HTML);
Commission Decision 2001/146, 2001 O.J. (L 59) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2001/1_059/1_05920010228en000 10042.pdf);
Commission Decision 2002/758, 2002 O.J. (L 257) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/enoj/2002/l_257/1_25720020925en000 1 0047.pdf; Press
Release, European Union, Competition: Commission Imposes a E49.5 Million Fine on
Peugeot for Obstructing New Car Exports from the Netherlands (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1227&guiLanguage=de.
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stiff competition from non-EU newcomers, placed a large question mark on
their ability to compete and survive. Despite the predicted growth of global
car sales due to an increasingly motorized generation, particularly from
among the "Asian dragons," analysts suggest that the emerging Chinese and
Indian manufacturers will be the ones to benefit from the rising demand.7
Recent studies suggest that European manufacturers' short-term solution-
merging their way to giant status-has had an adverse impact on the firms'
profitability.8 This merging tendency has created a "bundling" effect, but
without follow-up efficiency improvements through renovation and
refurbishment. Added to these woes, the industry is faced with the difficult
task of complying with detailed and complex EC competition rules, while
the Commission continues in its monitoring and sanctioning role, as shown
by its most recent actions: a EUR 49.5 million fine imposed on Peugeot in
2005 for obstructing car exports, and an investigation into BMW and
General Motors' practices against the backdrop of Regulation 1400/2002,
the block exemption for car distribution.9
This paper examines the task of the European legislator in the
evolution of the car sector, and attempts to establish what role the now
"modernized" EC competition law should play in light of the industry's
gloomy road ahead. 0 Particular attention is paid to the application of
7 Extinction of the Predator, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2005, at 63.
8 id.
9 Commission Regulation 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the Application of Article 81(3)
of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor
Vehicle Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 30-41 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 1400/2002], available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/1-203/1-20320020801len0300041
.pdf. This regulation replaced Commission Regulation 1475/95, 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25-34,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995R1475
:EN:HTML, itself a reform of Commission Regulation 123/85, 1985 O.J. (L 15) 16,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31985R0123
:EN:HTML, the first ever block exemption for motor vehicle distribution in Europe.
10 The regime affecting the distribution of motor vehicles changed with the introduction
of Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9, as a part of a major overhaul of EC competition law
that has been taking place over the last decade. See id. Also relevant for our purposes are
the changes in procedural rules introduced with Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002
on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty, 2002 O.J. (LI) 1-25 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/site/enloj/2003/l_001/_00120030104en00010025.pdf, which provides for the decentralized
application of Article 81 as a whole, as well as Article 82. The modernization package is
comprised of this regulation and a whole set of binding and non-binding legislation that
came into force on May 1, 2004 covering, inter alia, conduct of proceedings, cooperation
within the network of competition authorities, cooperation with the courts of EU Member
States, handling of complaints, informal guidance, effect on trade, and the application of
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. See EUROPA, DG Competition, Antitrust,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/#procedural-rules (last
visited Nov. 25, 2007).
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Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty ("Article 81(1) EC")11 and the exemptions
granted on the basis of Article 81(3) EC-currently via Regulation
1400/20021 2-to distribution agreements in the car sector. Community
regulation appears to have had a limited impact on the narrowing of price
differentials across Europe, which has come about primarily as a result of
other factors. To the detriment of economic efficiency, EC competition
policy has been thus far affected by external concerns for integration and
consumer protection (and the industry's interests in the case of the car
sector). For this reason, the Commission's much criticized application of
EC antitrust provisions may have exacerbated the difficulties already faced
by a declining industry. It is clearly not the role of EC competition law to
protect less efficient firms-even though the high degree of competition in
the car market is likely to wipe out some established European car
manufacturers. 13 However, what this paper explores is whether the existing
competition rules are imposing additional and unnecessary burdens on
manufacturers or if, on the contrary, efficiency arguments can serve to
justify the current rules. Beyond pure economic efficiency, 4 justification
can be found for pursuing other goals through antitrust doctrine. After all,
as Komesar notes, Pareto optimal transactions can be truly unjust.15 In the
context of the car industry, manufacturers have long enjoyed an
advantageous position vis-6-vis dealers and oftentimes consumers, and the
Commission's policy has proven rather unsuccessful in re-establishing
greater parity. Nonetheless, is the role of competition policy protecting
dealers or consumers? The aim, in this context, is to assess how the new
procedural and substantive rules for competition policy should be applied
so as to provide for a sound application of the new rules and a coherent
policy for future development of the car sector.
In order to determine the extent to which the application of EC
antitrust provisions has affected the present situation of the European car
sector, this study consists of four parts following this introduction. Part II
explores price differentials and their justifications using relevant reports and
studies available on the subject. Part III comprises a study of the possible
causes for the decrease in the differences: the impact of the introduction of
11 EC Treaty, supra note 5, at 64.
12 See Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9.
13 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2004).
14 For a study of the concept of economic efficiency in the European context, see Damien
Geradin, Efficiency Claims in EC Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulation
(European Univ. Inst., Florence, Working Paper Series 327, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractjid=617922.
15 NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY 32 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994); see also VILFREDO PARETO,
MANUALE D'ECONOMIA POLITICA (SocietA Editrice Libraria, 1906).
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the euro, the rise of the Internet, and the challenges faced by European car
manufacturers in a transformed global market. In Part IV, the evolution of
competition law in regulating the car industry is examined, as well as the
relevant economic and legal theories to assess the existence of Regulation
1400/2002 on the one hand and the condemnation of price differentials on
the other. The Part V attempts to evaluate the impact of this regulation on
consumer welfare through a study of consumer preferences based on
available data, personal interviews with consumers and a survey conducted
by the author.
II. PRICE DIFFERENTIALS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
COMPETITION POLICY
A. General Remarks
When it comes to conceptualizing price differentials and price
discrimination, it has been said on occasion that "[n]o definition exists to
cover all real-world situations."' 16 Indeed, it seems difficult to impose a
single definition of price discrimination on so many business practices
arising in the marketplace, and defining it has been described as a "thorny
issue." 17  Generally, price discrimination implies higher prices for some
consumers than for others as a consequence of the use of diverse
distribution channels.' 8  In economic terms, Kahana and Spiegel define
price discrimination as "the existence of uneqIual arithmetic difference of
price and marginal cost among consumers. ' 9  Other authors prefer to
describe them as the existence of unequal ratios of price and marginal
cost.2° In any case, this research has proven a general lack of concern in the
literature over the precise choice of definition, which some believe reflects
the fact that most authors do not consider the choice to be very
consequential.21
16 Stan J. Liebowitz, Price Differentials and Price Discrimination: Reply and Extensions,
26 ECON. INQUIRY 779, 779-83 (1988) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Price Differentials].
17 MOTTA, supra note 13, at 491 n.105. In a similar way, for international price
dispersion to exist, it must be profitable for firms and feasible to set different prices.
Goldberg and Verboven, supra note 1, at 489.
18 Peter C. Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: The
Efficiency Hypothesis Versus the Rent-Seeking, Strategic Alternatives, 69 ANTITRUST 569,
571 (2001).
19 Nava Kahana & Uriel Spiegel, On the Definition of Price Discrimination, 26 ECON.
INQUIRY 775, 775-77 (1988).
20 Stan J. Liebowitz, Tie-in Sales and Price Discrimination, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 387, 387-
99 (1983) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Tie-in Sales].
21 Liebowitz, Price Differentials, supra note 16, at 783. For further explanations of price
discrimination, see generally Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597, 597-654 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:35 (2007)
Regardless of the terminology used, price differentials are a common
phenomenon. As Motta puts forward, "[P]rice discrimination is a
persuasive phenomenon, of which examples from our daily life abound. 22
Relying on Pigou, for Motta there are two essential conditions for price
differentiation to exist. 23 First, a firm must be able to differentiate between
consumers so that it can charge different prices. Second, the absence of
arbitrage is essential-that is, consumers are unable to re-sell the goods
among each other.24 For our purposes, this study focuses on territorial price
discrimination-"a company's abilit%5 to charge different prices for the
same product in different countries' -which clearly meets Motta's two
conditions: 1) the existence of national barriers makes it possible to
distinguish between consumers in different countries and 2) agreements
between manufacturers and their distributors usually contain exclusivity
clauses by which only those appointed dealers, and not consumers, will be
able to distribute the products in question within their allotted territory.
26
Prices differ not only across national borders, but also across regions
within any one nation, and even within a specific town. 27 Abundant studies
confirm this reality,28 but regardless of the evidence most consumers will
1989); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (MIT Press 1988).
22 MOTTA, supra note 13, at 491.
23 Id. at 492-93 (relying on ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (MacMillan
1920)).
24 A third requirement would be the existence of market power. Varian, supra note 21.
Firms with limited market power will have a limited impact on prices through discriminatory
prices, but most firms in the real world have some market power. MOTTA, supra note 13, at
492 n. 107.
25 Enrico Bachis & Claudio A. Piga, Do Prices Grow More in Euroland? Evidence from
the Airline Industry 2,(Loughborough Univ. Dept. Econ., Working Paper No. WP 2006-8,
2006), available at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec/RePEc/lbo/lbowps/bachis-piga_2
.pdf According to Motta, this constitutes third-degree discrimination (as opposed to first-
degree discrimination, whereby a monopolist charges the maximum price consumers are
willing to pay, or second-degree discrimination, whereby consumers choose one deal among
several offered by a firm). MOTTA, supra note 13, at 492.
26 See MOTTA, supra note 13, at 492-93. Even if these conditions now permit price
differentiation, the Commission is fighting to make the practice more difficult by ensuring
that parallel imports are not precluded. See infra Part IV.
27 See Phillipp Maier, A Global Village without Borders? International Price Differentials
at eBay 2 (Sept. 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://webmail.econ.ohio-
state.edu/john/jmcb-frb/eBayI .pdf.
28 See, e.g., Takaboshi Tabuchi, On Interregional Price Differentials, 52 JAPANESE
ECON. REV. 104 (2001); David W.Yoskowitz, Price Differentials in a Homogeneous
Market: The Case of Water, 7 INT'L ADVANCES IN ECON. RESEARCH 100 (2001);
Fabio Canova & Evi Pappa, Price Differentials in Monetary Unions: the Role of Fiscal
Shocks (June 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://www.econ.upfiedu
/docs/papers/downloads/923.pdf; Karen Clay & Choon Hong Tay, Cross-Country Price
Differentials in the Online Textbook Market, (May 24, 2001) (unnumbered working paper),
available at http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cache/papers/cs/23509/http:zSzzSzwww.heinz.cmu
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have developed their own awareness. Let us consider three common
examples of price differentials-local, interregional, and cross-border. The
first type-those that occur within one region (often within a specific town
or city) are the most easily identified by consumers. Everyday grocery
costs, for instance, vary significantly across a range of local supermarkets,
and are typically lower than those found in "open all hours" stores, which
provide an arguably more flexible service.
As regards the second type, interregional differentials, most consumers
will have travelled and identified variations. Tabuchi, for instance, uses the
high price of a cup of coffee in a caf& located on the Avenue des Champs
lElys~es compared to what it would cost in other regions of France as an
example.29 This difference in price may result from higher costs such as
rent, as well as the locational advantages of the former over the latter,
which are factored in to the overall service price.3 ° Other examples with
which the reader may be familiar include variations in the cost of housing,
land or even gas across regions even within one country.31
The third category, cross-border price differentials, is arguably the
most difficult for everyday consumers to identify. Having said that,
international travel is becoming ever more common. The creation of a
single market in Europe has added to this phenomenon by facilitating travel
within the European Community and encouraging the growth of low-cost
airlines. As a consequence, Europeans have become ever more aware of
cross-border variations in price for all sorts of goods, such as food, tobacco,
or clothing.
Prima facie, such variations in price would not appear to be overly
problematic. Yet, the Commission's concerns about car price differentials
follow two principal trains of thought. First of all, in the context of the
creation of a common market, an analysis of cross-border price divergence
should reveal the scope and development of market integration. If the free
movement of goods can be guaranteed within a truly single market, then
consumers will be fully empowered to "shop around" the entire Union for
their vehicles, leading eventually to price convergence. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to examine the merits of this specific argument, however
what emerges from this study is that price differentials across the European
Union point to a lack of fully integrated markets. The second field where
price differentials would play a role is competition policy. Both lines are
.eduzSz-kclayzSztextbook.pdf/clayO 1 crosscountry.pdf.
29 Tabuchi, supra note 28, at 104.
30 Id.
31 For a detailed study of price differentials in the oil market, see Robert Bacon & Silvana
Tordo, Crude Oil Price Differentials and Differences in Oil Qualities: A Statistical Analysis
(ESMAP Technical Paper No. 081, 2005), available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org
/esmap/site.nsf/files/081-05+Final+_for Web.pdf/$FILE/081-05+Final+_forWeb.pdf.
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somewhat intertwined, as integration has been explicitly recognized by the
European institutions as a goal of competition policy.12 In the words of
Mario Monti, former Commissioner for competition, EC antitrust policy has
played a fundamental role in the creation of the single market and increased
economic dynamism. 33  The European courts have also recognized the
importance of integration in antitrust. Since the ruling by the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") in Consten Grundig, 4 an agreement which may
have the effect of dividing the market along national lines may be
prohibited, even if its effects are not anti-competitive.35
From the perspective of competition policy, if different prices are
charged for goods produced at the same cost in different locations this
could be an indication of anti-competitive behavior. In a competitive
market, two factors should contribute to price harmonization. From the
point of view of the consumer, if there is price transparency and thus
awareness of the differentials, it should act as encouragement for consumers
to buy their products in the cheaper markets to benefit from price
differentials. Besides, agents may be tempted to buy goods at cheaper
locations and resell them at places where prices are high, which, according
to the "law of one price," should naturally make prices converge.36 If this is
not the case, then price differentials could be interpreted as an indicator of
the existence of agreements or practices that preclude this from happening.
Therefore, price differentials are not in themselves necessarily harmful, but
could hint at the existence of anti-competitive practices that could fall
within the scope of Article 81 (1) of the EC Treaty.
B. Peculiarities of Car Price Differentials in the European Union
One can find abundant literature on price differentials. The studies
consulted refer to different kinds of goods-from housing to crude oil,
water, books, cars, cosmetic products, or audiovisual equipment, 37 and
provide an insight into the problems and causes of price divergence. With
regard to cars, since the early 1980s, a considerable amount of research has
been produced by consumer associations, competition agencies, and
academics. They provide an evaluation of the presence of different prices
and their underlying causes. In this part the aim is to focus on the main
32 ttablissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Comm'n of the Euro.
Econ. Community, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966] C.M.L.R. 299.
33 Mario Monti, La Nueva Politica Europea de la Competencia, in EL NUEVO
DERECHO COMUNITARIO Y ESPAN4OL DE LA COMPETENCIA (Jos6 Maria Beneyto
Perez ed., 2002).
14 [1966] C.M.L.R. at 342-43.
35 Id.
36 Maier, supra note 27, at 1.
37 See studies cited supra notes 25, 27-28 & 31.
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findings in these reports, the European Commission's secondary
legislation-block exemption regulations and decisions-in this area, and
other non-binding documents from the European institutions, such as
Guidelines and Notices.
1. Essential Definitions
It is important to highlight, as Degryse and Verboven explain,38 that
there are two different types of price differentials. First of all, the authors
use the term international price dispersion to refer to intra-EU price
differentials that exist for individual models in the territory of the European
Union. This would examine, for instance, the difference between the cost
of a Ford Fiesta in the Netherlands and in France. Second, they refer to
systematic price differentials, which estimate the average differences across
countries-i.e., how much more expensive cars are in the Netherlands than
in France. The European Consumers' Organization ("BEUC") definition of
price differentials as "differences between recommended retail prices net of
taxes" refers to the former.39 International price dispersion indicators
normally show much larger variations than systematic price differentials, as
systematic price differentials are an average of the former, and averages
smooth out variations. It should also be noted that most reports focus on
pre-tax differentials, although some figures of post-tax prices are also
available. In theory, according to the "law of one price" mentioned above,
competition should drive post-tax driven differentials to zero. Currently,
the European institutions do not have any power to introduce legislation
harmonizing taxes in the different Member States, and therefore these
differentials escape the control of the Commission.
It is equally important to discern how the European institutions draw
the line between acceptable and unacceptable differentials. According to a
rule established by the Commission in the Notice on Regulation 123/85,40
recommended retail prices for a specific car model should not exceed 12
percent of the lowest price a.4  Exceptionally, the differential may exceed
this percentage by 6 percent for a period of less than one year or for an
insignificant percentage of motor vehicles. This means that a de minimis
rule is established, by which differentials of between 12 and 18 percent are
generally considered acceptable. However, price differentials have
38 Hans Degryse & Frank Verboven, Car Price Differentials in the European Union: An
Economic Analysis (Nov. 2000) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ec.europa
.eu/comm/competition/sectors/motor-vehicles/documents/car-price-differentias.pdf.
39 See Press Release, BEUC, Car Distribution: Time for Change at Long Last? (Sept. 29,
2005), available at http://docshare.beuc.org/Common/GetFile.asp?ID=18275&mfd=off
&LogonName=Guesten.
40 Commission Regulation 123/85, supra note 9.
41 Commission Notice (EC) 85/C 17/03 of 18 Jan. 1985, art. II § 1(a).
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traditionally exceeded 20 percent and could be as high as 65 percent.
42
2. Main Findings
Since 1992, the Commission has published biyearly reports on car
price differentials across the European Union.43 An examination of these
reports shows a steady decrease in these variations in price, particularly
since 2004. Importantly, manufacturers had been claiming that prices were
converging long before this date, and from as early as 2000 a number of
independent studies confirmed their view. For instance, an independent
survey by the Alliance and Leicester in 2000 found that the price of a new
car in Britain-the most expensive market for cars in Europe-fell by more
than 12 percent during that year." Manufacturers also complained that the
Commission normally referred to pre-tax prices, which are not always a fair
reflection of the market price actually being paid by consumers. In
Denmark, for instance, Value Added Tax ("VAT") can account for up to
two-thirds of the total cost of a car, while in the United Kingdom, VAT
typically accounts for a mere fifth of the total cost.
Studies undertaken by BEUC similarly serve as a useful source of
information.45 In their reports, a sample of popular car models was taken
with comparable specifications across European countries. 46  For each
model, pre-tax common currency prices in the various EU countries were
computed and expressed relative to the price in a base country. These
relative prices were then averaged across all models to obtain a measure for
the general car price level in the Member States. Over the period
1981 through 1993, BEUC found the pre-tax car price level to be the lowest
in Denmark, followed by Greece and the Benelux countries. Higher car
price levels occurred in Italy, Spain, and Sweden (in the 30-50 percent
range), Ireland (in the 40-60 percent range, and the United Kingdom (in the
42 See Europa, Car Price Reports Archive, supra note 1.
43 The first report was European Comm'n, Intra-EC Car Price Differential Report
(1992). Denmark, Finland and Greece were not included until May 1, 1999 because of those
nations' high taxes. See Europa, Car Price Reports Archive, supra note 1; Degryse &
Verboven, supra note 38, at 4, 29, 30.
" BBC News, EU: Cars Cost Most in the UK, Jul. 23, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/business/1451560.stm.
45 See BEUC, Report on Car Prices and the Private Import of Cars in the EEC
Countries, BEUC/71/81 (1981); BEUC, Report on Car Prices and the Private Import of
Cars in the EEC Countries, BEUC/105/82 (1982); BEUC, Car Price Differences in the EEC,
BEUC/121/86 (1986); BEUC, Car Report 1987: Survey on the Application of Regulation
123/85 Exempting the Selective Distribution System for Cars, BEUC/200/87 (1988); BEUC,
EEC Study on Car Prices and Progress Towards 1992, BEUC/10/89 (1989); BEUC,
Parallel Imports for Cars in the EC, BEUC/222/92 (1992) (all reports on file with author).
46 Twenty-five models in 1981 and 1982, thirty models in 1986, twenty-two models in
1987, twenty-four in 1989, and thirteen in 1992. See supra note 45.
On the Road to Perdition
28:35 (2007)
50-80 percent range)). BEUC originally blamed the differentials on taxes,
differences in the degree of competition, profit margins, and price controls.
In subsequent studies, BEUC also highlighted that local price increases
were the greatest in countries with high inflation rates and depreciating
currencies. 4' These studies generated a lot of public policy attention, and
were the seed that encouraged the Commission to carry out its own
investigations.
The Commission's reports differ from the BEUC studies in terms of
methodology and focus. They conduct a more detailed adjustment for
specification differences across cars, and also attempt to account for
discounts and financial benefits. The focus is placed on the magnitude of
the price differentials for individual car models-what was defined above
as international price dispersion.48 The 1992 study found that specification-
adjusted maximum car price differentials frequently exceeded the above-
mentioned 12 and 18 percent margin.49  According to the Notice on
Regulation 123/85, the selective and exclusive distribution systems are
compatible with European Commission law if, among other conditions, the
maximum price differentials are no larger than 18 percent for a shorter
period.5 °
In addition, the UK Competition Commission, formerly known as the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission "MMC"), similarly investigated car
price differentials in Europe, with a particular focus on the UK market.51
The higher cost of motor vehicles in this country can be best explained with
reference to the situation in 1992, when the pound devalued and Britain was
forced to withdraw from the European Monetary System on September 16,
1992-the infamous Black Wednesday. As a consequence, the sterling
pound experienced a drastic fall against other European currencies, with a
consequential rise in prices. Regrettably for UK consumers, as the currency
slowly recovered, prices remained constant. The effect was significant
price divergence between the United Kingdom and much of continental
Europe. The highly publicized "Rip-Off Britain" campaign sought to
restore the balance. UK consumers sought to take matters into their own
hands by endeavoring to shop outside the country for cheaper cars, and the
United Kingdom also saw a growth in imports from Europe.52 This
47 See supra note 45.
48 See Europa, Car Price Reports Archive, supra note 1.
49 BEUC/222/92, supra note 45.
50 Commission Notice, supra note 41.
51 See COMPETITION COMMISSION, NEW CARS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF NEW MOTOR
CARS WITHIN THE UK (2000), available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk
/rep-pub/reports/2000/439cars.htm#full [hereinafter COMPETITION COMMISSION].
52 For more details on this, see, for example, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
GLOBALIZATION AND MANUFACTURING (2006) (commissioned by KPMG), available at
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progression is evidenced in the MMC reports.53 In an initial 1992 study, the
MMC concluded that the UK market did not show excessive adjusted price
differentials when compared with France and Germany, with those two
markets revealing the greatest similarity to that of the United Kingdom.54
In its more recent 1999 report,55 the MMC made use of the
Commission's own figures, arguing that this data was a more reliable
means of revealing actual price differentials. The main focus was on the
measurement of the general car price level, but it also considered car price
differentials for individual models to assess the full extent of arbitrage
opportunities. The MMC reported that the general car price level in the
United Kingdom was higher than in France, Germany, and Italy by a
margin of between 3.5 and 7.1 percent over the period 1993-2000, and by a
margin of 10.1 and 12.6 percent over the second half of that period.
Considering hedonic price indices in 1999, the MMC reported that the
majority of the models were at least 20 percent more expensive in the
United Kingdom than in other countries with similar tax regimes.
56
Over the years, economists, jurists, and political scientists have
published numerous studies on the construction of hedonic price indices:
Mertens and Ginsburgh (1985), 57 Ginsburgh and Vanhamme (1989), 58
Mertens (1990), 59 Goldberg and Verboven (1998),60 or Degryse and
Verboven (2000).61 Several analyses considered a long time horizon to
evaluate the persistence of car price differentials. Most studies found large
differences in the general car price level between countries, broadly
consistent with the results from the above policy reports. In addition, a
sustained difference in price was recorded, despite a rather substantial year-
to-year volatility for some countries. It seems that the volatility of price
differentials is linked to exchange rate fluctuations. Importantly, studies do
http://www.kpmg.co.uk/industries/a/pubs.cfm# (scroll down and click on "Globalization and
Manuracturing"; then download PDF); Janet Gillen, UK-Competition Commission Report
on Supply of New Cars, in COMPETITION COMMENT (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer,
London, UK), June/July 2000; BBC News, supra note 44.
" COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 5 1.
54 See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, New Motor Cars-A Report on the Supply
of New Motor Cars Within the United Kingdom, Vols. 1 & 2, HMSO, London (1992).
55 COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 51.
56 Id. § 1.13.
57 Yves Mertens & Victor Ginsburgh, Product Differentiation and Price Discrimination
in the European Community: The Case ofAutomobiles, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 151 (1985).
58 Victor Ginsburgh & Geneviive Vanhamme, Price Differences in the EC Car Market:
Some Further Results, 16/17 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 137 (1989).
59 YVES MERTENS, MODELLING PRICE BEHAVIOUR IN THE EUROPEAN CAR MARKET: 1970-
1985 (1990) (on file with author).
60 Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Frank Verboven, The Evolution of Price Dispersion in
the European Car Market, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 811 (2001).
61 Degryse & Verboven, supra note 38; see also Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1.
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show, for example, that in periods when the British pound was relatively
weak, car price indices were low, 62 and that when the Italian lira
strengthened, prices were high in Italy.63
A number of studies go one step further and explore the validity of
those explanations offered by policy makers and industry insiders for price
differentials. Consumers' preference for domestic produce was considered
a reasonable explanation for international price differentials. The
importance of several regulatory factors was also investigated. Exchange
rate fluctuations, tax differentials, and trade restrictions-tariffs and
quotas-create different cost conditions across European markets. The
"Study on the Impact of Possible Future Legislative Scenarios for Motor
Vehicle Distribution on All Parties Concerned" carried out by Andersen on
behalf of the Commission (the "Andersen Study") found several
justifications for price divergence across the European Union.64 These
included the existence of national tax regimes, the presence of domestic
manufacturers who typically enjoy an "advantageous market position...
with higher prices as a result," "a population density that allows for
different coverage and behaviour," and "greater or lesser use of alternative
channels. 65
The Andersen Study has been harshly criticized by BEUC. The
association complains particularly that the effect of taxes on pre-tax prices
is that they tend to be lower. This proves, according to BEUC, that
manufacturers squeeze more profit from those countries with lower taxes
where they know that consumers are not affected by a high increase of a
vehicle's cost by taxation. The Commission appears supportive of BEUC
on this point. The chart below reveals car price differentials in the European
Union according to a study commissioned by the institution in November
1999, and which appeared in the Report on the Evaluation of Regulation
1475/95 .66 It is the average price index (systematic price differentials) and
62 Periods 1980-1983 and 1997-2000. See Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 60, at 822;
Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 498.
63 Period 1981-1991. See Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 60, at 822; Goldberg &
Verboven, supra note 1, at 498.
64 European Commission, Director General Competition [DG COMP], Study on the
Impact of Possible Future Legislative Scenarios for Motor Vehicle Distribution on All
Parties Concerned, at 48 (Mar. 3, 2001) (published by Andersen) [hereinafter Andersen
Study], available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/motor-vehicles
/documents/distribution.html.
65 Id.
66 Commission Report on the Evaluation of Regulation (EC) No. 1475/95 on the
Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle
Distribution and Servicing Agreements, at 100, COM (2000) 743 final (Nov. 15, 2000)
[hereinafter Evaluation of Regulation No. 1475/95], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2000/com2000_0743en01 .pdf.
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reflects the impact of taxes.
In Figure 1.1, the Commission seeks to highlight how pre-tax prices
are normally lower in those countries where taxes are higher. This is
especially obvious if one considers the cases of Denmark and Finland. It is
also noteworthy that the most significant differentials-with the exception
of the United Kingdom--occur when taxes are factored in; post-tax prices
are, in some cases (particularly in Denmark), almost twice as high as the
cost of vehicles in other EU Member States (such as Spain, Belgium, Italy,
or Luxembourg). Indeed, this could be an indication that manufacturers do
try to increase their profits in those countries where taxes are lower.
However, practice and microeconomic theory reflect that these differences








DKGRFIN P IRLNL A E S B F IT UK D L
=Index including ta xe s
1 1ndex before taxes
Figure 1. Car Price Differentials Net of Taxes and Including Taxes (1/11/99)
3. Brief Reference to Price Differentials in the United States
To fully emphasize the peculiarities of price differentials in the
European Union, it is worth referring to how price discrimination is viewed
in the United States. Although the United States is a politically and
economically integrated country, price differentials also occur between the
different states, even if they are much less noticeable than in Europe. In the
car sector, besides territorial price differences, manufacturers and their
dealers seem to employ other ways of implementing price discrimination, a
67 See infra Part IV.D.
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particularly frequent practice in recent years.68  These differentials are
introduced by having two different purchase alternatives for consumers.
The first of these includes "cash back" rebate offers, while the second
comprises a low interest rate on financing.
One author has highlighted that, with this choice of incentives,
manufacturers can potentially differentiate between households with
different levels of willingness and ability to purchase a car. On the one
hand, a high price for the vehicle and a low finance rate might appeal to
households who value the vehicle highly, but cannot pay for it immediately.
On the other hand, a low price for the vehicle with a high interest rate
should be more attractive for those who can pay for the vehicle at the time
of purchase.
Nevertheless, as opposed to the European Union, antitrust authorities
have not shown a concern for these practices. Despite the prohibition of
price discrimination contained in the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act ("RP
Act"),69 which is still in force, the statute has not only been staunchly
criticized, it has also been decreasingly applied in the last forty years. °
Thus, in U.S. antitrust law, firms currently have a high degree of freedom to
set prices when they manage to avoid dominance and price-fixing
agreements. This is mainly a consequence of the fact that U.S. policy
makers act on a belief that pricing should be left to the market. If that is the
case, then any excessive prices will be corrected (i.e. if firm A is charging
too much for its products, then there will be an incentive for other
competing firms to lower their prices and increase their sales; firm A will
eventually have to reduce its prices if it wants to remain in that market).
C. Explanations for the Differentials
1. Taxes
Different tax systems account for a large part of the differentials in
post-tax prices, 71 and this is not exclusive to the European car sector.
72
68 See Steven Berry, James Levinsohn & Ariel Pakes, Differentiated Products Demand
Systems from a Combination of Micro and Macro Data: The New Car Market, 112 J. POL.
ECON. 68 (2004).
69 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2007).
70 See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J., 377, 410 (2003); see also Terry Calvani & Gilde
Breidenbach, An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman Act and Its Enforcement by the
Government, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 765 (1991).
71 Differences of 5-10 percent still exist in value-added taxes. Goldberg & Verboven,
supra note 1, at 490.
72 See Laurence J. DeFranco, William Lilley III & John R. Dunham, The Case of the
Transient Taxpayer: How Tax-Driven Price Differentials for Commodity Goods Can Create
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Maier, for instance, carries out a study of differentials within the common
market in various products sold on the Internet, particularly on eBay. 3 He
refers to differences in taxation as one of the principal causes of price
differentials.74 In the car sector, taxes can account for over 50 percent of
the purchase price in some countries. 75  Studies also reflect that pre-tax
prices tend to be lower in those countries with high taxation, such as
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands.76  This leads Degryse and
Verboven to conclude that "price dispersion would be reduced if a
harmonisation of car purchase taxation took place. 77 Therefore, from the
point of view of end consumers it is likely that harmonizing taxes across
Europe would be a much more efficient way of reducing the differentials.
However, the founding Treaties give the Commission no power to act in the
field of tax harmonization. Moreover, given the major political sensitivities
involved in relation to the concept of the welfare state, which varies across
Member States, it is an area that has remained in the hands of the national
governments. A discussion on the adequacy of harmonizing taxes is
beyond the scope of this paper.78 It needs to be noted however that, in
contrast to most other goods, car taxes are paid by consumers in the country
of use and not where the car is purchased. As Goldberg and Verboven
posit, "Pre-tax prices are the ones relevant to arbitrageurs, so if markets
were fully integrated, pre-tax car prices should be equalized across
countries, leaving post-tax car prices to differ only due to local car taxes.
79
Therefore, it is still necessary to find justifications for pre-tax differentials,
which for our purposes are of particular relevance.
2. Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Divergent Fiscal Policies
According to Degryse and Verboven, in systematic price differentials,
exchange rates play an important role in explaining short-term fluctuations,
whereas taxes are important determinants of long term, persisting
systematic price differentials. They refer to an "incomplete pass-through of
Improbable Markets, Bus. ECON. July 1998, at 43.
73 See Maier, supra note 27.
74 Id. at 3.
75 Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 490.
76 See supra Part II.B.2.
77 Degryse & Verboven, supra note 38, at 13.
78 On the subject of EU tax harmonization, see generally JAMES BARR & MATTHEW
ELLIOT, MOVING ON UP: EU TAX HARMONISATION PLANS (The European Foundation)
(1998), available at http://www.europeanfoundation.org/docs/moving.pdf; STEVE BOND ET
AL., CORPORATE TAX HARMONISATION IN EUROPE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE (The Institute for
Fiscal Studies) (2000), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication
id=188; Kitty Ussher, The Myth of Tax Harmonisation, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM
BULLETIN, Feb. 1999, available at http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/n-4-4.html.
79 Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 490-91.
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taxes, tariffs and exchange rates." 80 It takes place when undertakings do not
fully pass through a change in a cost variable to consumer prices, thus
resulting in differences in pre-tax prices.8' Therefore, currency exchange
fluctuations account for part of the differentials. For instance, the
depreciation of the Italian lira in the early 1990s led to* temporary low
distribution costs in Italy, and the depreciation of the British pound in the
same decade and its subsequent appreciation led to large fluctuations in the
local costs. 82 The introduction of the euro has naturally eliminated this
problem within the twelve Member States that have adopted the single
currency, 83 but thirteen other members of the European Union have to date
not entered into the Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU"), including the
United Kingdom-the most expensive market. Canova and Pappa, in their
study of price differentials and monetary shocks, also consider differences
in the fiscal policies of countries as a cause for price differentials.8 4 The
effects of differences in national fiscal policies in price differentials have
also been reduced with the creation of the EMU, as there is now one policy
for the twelve Member States involved.
3. Local Costs and Shipping Expenses
An important explanation highlighted by Maier-sometimes under-
emphasized by the Commission-would be the consequence of certain local
costs, 85 such as divergent rents for supermarkets and stores, or wages for
employers in the Member States.8 6 Wages and rents differ across countries,
as well as advertising, marketing and servicing costs, and this can have an
impact on the final price of the products. In the European car sector, it is
estimated that local costs can account for up to 40 percent of the price of a
car.87 Shipping costs could also be included here, as the total price paid by
the consumer increases when a product is produced in a Member State
80 Degryse & Verboven, supra note 38, at 45 (emphasis in original).
81 See id. at 45-46.
82 See Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 491.
83 See supra Part III.B. 1; see also Michael R. Baye et al., Did the Euro Foster On-Line
Price Competition? Evidence from an International Price Comparison Site, 44 EcON.
INQUIRY 265, 265-79 (2006).
84 See Canova & Pappa, supra note 28.
85 Degryse and Verboven refer to "differences in local costs" as an explanation for the
differences. Degryse & Verboven, supra note 38, at 45.
86 See id. at 45; see also Shelby D. Gerking & William N. Weirick, Compensating
Differences and Interregional Wage Differentials, 65 REv. EcON. & STATISTICS 483 (1983);
J. Vernon Henderson, Evaluating Consumer Amenities and Interregional Welfare
Differences, 11 J. URBAN ECON. 32 (1982); Jennifer Roback, Wages, Rents, and the Quality
of Life,. 90 J. POL. ECON. 1257 (1982).
87 Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 489; see also Goldberg & Verboven, supra
note 60.
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different from that of the purchase. For instance, Maier estimated that
shipping costs for products sold on the Internet could explain up to 60
percent of the price differentials for regressions between different countries
that have adopted the euro. 88 These extra costs partially justify the different
prices charged at different locations, and limit the freedom manufacturers
have to set prices, given that in some locations manufacturers incur
additional costs, which necessarily have an impact on the final price.
4. Divergences in National Product Regulations
Differences in product regulation across Europe are generally regarded
as a cause for price differentials.89  However, the impact of this
phenomenon has been limited over the years as the process of integration
taking place in Europe has advanced and a sea of directives harmonizing
product standards has been adopted by the European institutions.
Nowadays, the path towards the free movement of goods has meant that
product regulation across Europe has become increasingly uniform, and
most of the differences that still remain are a consequence of exceptions
granted to some countries on the basis of Article 30 EC90 or the Cassis de
Dijon "mandatory requirements." 91 The abolishment of import duties as for
intra-EU trade has also contributed to the progressive disappearance of this
cause.
5. Demand Elasticity
Goldberg and Verboven note that firms tend to have an incentive to
charge higher prices in those markets where consumers are the least price
sensitive. Although this factor is overlooked by Maier and some of the
leading studies, evidence in the car market suggests that consumers are less
influenced by price when it comes to national brands, whereas price
sensitivity increases for foreign brands. Our consumer survey 93 also
reflected this, particularly in Germany, as 67 percent of the people
questioned stated an unconditional preference for German cars regardless of
price. At the same time, when asked under what circumstances they would
consider buying a different brand, price was second in importance, after
brand reputation. However, of those consumers who owned a car from
another Member State, almost 78 percent said they would consider
88 Maier, supra note 27, at 20.
" See id. at 4.
90 EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 30.
91 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltun fir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649.
92 See Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 491.
9' See infra Part V.
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purchasing a vehicle from a different manufacturer if the price was
adequate.
6. The Remainder-Possible Explanations
After taking into consideration the justifications traditionally given for
price differentials, still more than half of the price differential range remains
apparently unexplained.94 The differences are more acute when considering
international price dispersion versus systematic price differentials, since the
latter is an average of the former and averages tend to smooth out
differences. In the words of Verboven and Degryse, "the systematic price
differentials can be fairly well explained by observed structural factors such
as taxes and exchange rates. In contrast, the price differentials for
individual car models... can only be explained to a partial extent by these
factors." 95  Outside of such factors, the Commission and consumer
organizations seem to believe that pricing policy is, to a great extent,
decided by manufacturers. However, the situation of European car
manufacturers places a question mark on the power that they have to set
prices, as will be analyzed in the next part.
In addition, some authors believe that the mere existence of national
borders between countries-the so-called "border effect"-is sufficient to
create frictions in international trade which cause significant price
differentials. 96 This idea is supported by empirical studies of different
products,97 and could also account for differences in the car industry. In
this sense, despite a growing share of product regulations being decided
upon in Brussels, it seems that national borders still create sufficient friction
to cause prices to differ significantly within the European Union. If
European markets were fully integrated, fewer opportunities to segment
markets and to change different prices would exist. Bluntly put, there is
still insufficient market integration, and the existence of price differentials
would be an indication of this, rather than a cause. For instance, in the
online market, shipping goods within a country takes about two days,
whereas shipping goods from one European country to another takes about
a week. By way of example, Maier notes that it is faster to ship goods
within Germany from Munich to Hamburg (about 450 miles) than between
two closer cities located in two different countries, such as Amsterdam and
Brussels (less than 100 miles).98 This situation is not peculiar to Europe; in
94 The residual price differential range resulting from the first measure of price dispersion
is 20.7 percent on average, compared to the initial 38.8 percent.
95 Degryse & Verboven, supra note 38, at 16-17.
96 See generally Maier, supra note 27; Carolyn L. Evans, The Economic Significance of
National Border Effects, 93 AM. ECON. REv. 1291 (2000).
9' See BEUC/222/92, supra note 45.
98 Maier, supra note 27.
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the United States, the situation seems to be similar: trade within the States
is about seven times higher than trade between the States. This would
justify the Commission's position and could mean that it is precisely the
lack of integration that is cause for concern.
As a conclusion to this part of the paper, which has studied the
existence of car price differentials and their causes, it seems that price
differentials are not a phenomenon peculiar to the automobile industry, and
are usually generated by causes similar to those of other sectors of the
economy. 9  It is a fact that consumers pay different prices for similar
goods, despite the price transparency provided by the Internet. 00 This even
occurs within the United States, and in online purchases. Therefore, it
remains interesting that so much effort has been invested to fight against
differentials in this sector, and in particular on the part of the Commission.
It is even more curious if one examines the figures provided by the
European Automobiles Manufacturers Association ("ACEA"), which
reflect that the car industry actually maintains relatively small differentials
when compared to other consumer goods.'0 ' No evidence is provided in the
available studies that these differentials are actually caused by the
manufacturers, which raises the question of how much power manufacturers
really have in setting high prices in such a competitive industry.
III. REASONS BEHIND PRICE CONVERGENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Recent Commission reports reflect a narrowing of car price
differentials. 10 2 This seems to be partly because prices in the ten Member
States which joined the European Union in May 2004 are included, and
prices tend to be relatively homogeneous between them. However, the
decrease is also noticeable among the former members, even if the United
Kingdom remains the most expensive market. This part attempts to find
explanations behind this new tendency. It seems that one of the principal
99 See, e.g., Stephanie Giaume & Sarah Guillou, Price Discrimination and Concentration
in European Airline Markets, 10 J. AIR TRANSPORT & MGMT. 305 (2004). Maier's study of
price differentials on products sold on the Internet also reflects important differences in the
prices of goods ranging from lipstick to books to audiovisuals and bras. Maier, supra note
27.
100 Maier, supra note 27, at 2; see also Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Lessons
About Markets from the Internet, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 148-55 (2005) (discussing
frictionless commerce and product differentiation).
101 See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Auto. Mfr. Ass'n, Price Differences for Cars are Smaller
than for Other Consumer Goods, (July 23, 2001), http://www.acea.be/files/23072001.pdf.
102 European Comm'n, Car Price Report: Main Highlights: Car Price Differentials
Across EU Remain at Low Level (May 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/comn/competition/sectors
/motorvehicles/prices/2007_05-a.pdf, see also Europa, Car Price Reports Archive, supra
note 1 (demonstrating this trend in years 2003 to 2007).
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causes is the enhancement of the integration of markets across Europe,
which has almost eliminated two of the principal causes for the
differentials-exchange rate fluctuations (and divergent fiscal policies), and
differences in national product regulations. More specifically, this part
focuses on what the author believes to be the two main culprits of price
convergence: 1) the increase in price transparency brought about principally
by the introduction of the single currency, and the boost of new
communication technologies such as the Internet on the one hand, and 2)
the position of European car manufacturers in the market as a result of
enhanced foreign competition on the other.
A. The Impact of Price Transparency
"The increasing significance of the Internet in recent years, as well as
the introduction of the euro, have made prices considerably more
transparent throughout Europe."'10 3 These two factors highlighted by
DaimlerChrysler have indeed facilitated consumers' access to information
regarding prices across Europe. In today's economic transactions,
consumers can observe and compare prices across different locations and
countries with relative ease. In the European context, the single currency
and the boost of the Internet are arguably the two principal conditions
which have contributed to the increase in price transparency.
1. The Single Currency
In January 2002, twelve of the then fifteen Member States of the
European Union entered into the third phase of the EMU and the euro
replaced national currencies in their territories. 10 4  The new currency
accounts for 25 percent of world GDP and 40 percent of world trade.'0 5 A
priori, the existence of a common currency would suggest greater price
transparency and lower transaction costs, and it was therefore expected that
this would somehow force upon manufacturers a duty to reduce price
differentials across the European Union. It would also eliminate exchange
rate volatility, which generally leads to differentials. 0 6 Major changes were
not reflected in figures gathered initially. In November 2001 the
Commission published the first report on car price differentials reflecting
103 DaimlerChrysler News, Mercedes-Benz P. Cars, Mercedes-Benz Leads the Way in
Harmonizing Prices Throughout Europe (Feb. 25, 2002), http://www.daimlerchrysier.com
/dccom/0-5-7153-1-9358-1-0-0-0-0-0-10748-7145-0-0-0-0-0-0- l.html.
104 Press Release, Eur. Cent. Bank, The Euro Cash Changeover Is Progressing Smoothly
in All Euro Area Countries (Jan. 2, 2002), http://www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2002/htm
/pr020102.en.html. The euro became legal tender on January 1, 2002 in twelve of the fifteen
Member States that formed the European Union.
105 Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 485.
106 Id. at 489.
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prices in the new single currency. 10 7 Germany and Austria remained the
most expensive markets, whereas Spain, Greece, and Finland were still the
cheapest. 10 8 Outside Euroland, the United Kingdom maintained its position
as the most expensive. 109
While the latest reports reflect smaller price differentials, the de
minimis rule is still violated in some cases-among the ninety car models
examined, twenty-five still have differences exceeding 20 percent. 10
Furthermore, our investigations have not been able to show a direct
correlation between the existence of a single currency and the decrease in
the differentials. It is questionable that such correlation exists. For instance
Denmark, a non-member of the Euro zone, traditionally has the lowest pre-
tax prices, whereas Germany and Austria, who have adopted the single
currency, are among the highest."' Even more worrying is the evidence
that seems to point towards a noticeable increase in the price level since the
introduction of the euro. 112 In this sense, the car sector is somehow an
exception, as studies point towards a decrease in price differentials in other
sectors in Euroland since 2002.
2. New Technologies
The technological revolution posed by the Internet is the second factor
to account for the increase in price transparency. 13 The Internet features
"low search costs, low barriers to entry and easier price comparability."'"14
Consumers no longer need to go cross-border to find out about prices in
107 Press Release, Eur. Union, Car Price Differentials in the European Union Remain
High, Especially in the Mass Market Segments (Feb. 25, 2002), http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/305&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLang
uage=en; see also Europa, Car Price Reports Archive, supra note 1 (bi-annual publication of
studies, on May 1 and Nov. 1, since 1992).
108 Introduction of Euro Has Not Caused Car Prices to Converge, and Differences
Remain Great Between One State and the Next, BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN EUROPE (Agence
Europe, Brussels), Feb. 25-26, 2002, at 10; see also Press Release, Eur. Union, supra note
108.
109 Id. (reporting greater differences in the prices of mini-cars and family models than for
luxury and monospace cars); DG COMP, Car Price Differentials Within the European
Union on 1 Nov. 2001, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/motorvehicles
/prices/200 1_11 .pdf.
110 See European Commission-Car Price Report at 1.05.2007, http://ec.europa.eu
/comm/competition/sectors/motor vehicles/prices/2007_05_rep-maintable.pdf.
111 See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Union, supra note 107.
112 See Baye et al., supra note 84, at 265 (finding that average and minimum prices
increased, respectively, by 3 and 7 percent in their study of the online market for electronic
goods).
113 See Michael R. Baye & John Morgan Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the
Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 454, 454 (2001).
114 Bachis & Piga, supra note 25, at 2.
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other countries. A simple search on the web will suffice to provide the
necessary information.' 5 There are search engines which can find the
cheapest store to buy a specific item, and which even compare prices across
countries-Kelkoo or Froogle are two good examples." 6 It is also possible
to browse for items on auction sites such as eBay. Online auctions have
been described as the closest one could reasonably get to perfect
competition, given the fragmentation of buyers and sellers with limited
market power. 17 According to eBay's 2003 annual report, 95 million users
from more than 150 countries listed 970 million items on eBay1 that year.
The total value of goods for that year nearly reached $24 billion.
Car manufacturers have progressively adapted to the new technologies
and most of them now allow consumers to buy their cars through their
websites."' 9 Consumers can "pick and choose" by selecting the car model
and potency of the engine and then adding any extras they may wish to
have. Detailed information regarding price is provided, even if consumers
need to be familiar with technicalities beforehand as no technical
explanations are generally provided on these sites. 120  Despite the
accessibility of the information, a survey conducted by the author on
European consumer preferences still reflected a certain reluctance to
actually purchase cars on the Internet, particularly among people aged thirty
and above. 2 1  Future generations, for whom internet sales are common,
could well change this tendency, and thus possibly change the way cars are
distributed forever. If internet sales rise, dealers' territorial exclusivity may
be put at risk. In such a scenario, there will be little incentive for them to
enter into dealership contracts, as they will not be rewarded for the
investments they are required to make if others can sell the same cars on the
web, presumably at more competitive prices.
B. The Position of the European Car Industry in the Global Market
When examining the effective power of car manufacturers over price,
the competitiveness of the European carmakers is a crucial factor.' 2 In
115 But see Ellison & Ellison, supra note 100.
116 Kelkoo.com, http://www.kelkoo.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2007); Google Product
Search, http://www.google.com/products (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
117 Maier, supra note 27, at 6.
118 Id.
119 The author has been regularly checking the car manufacturers' websites since 2001.
In the last few years, they seem to work much better whereas originally many technical
problems occurred which made it virtually impossible to compare prices online.
120 Very little information is provided, for instance, on what the characteristics of each of
the different models are and how they differ from each other.
121 See infra Part V.
122 A competitive market would be one which allocates resources to its best use.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:35 (2007)
order to be able to raise prices with the sole purpose of increasing benefits,
a manufacturer ought to have an advantageous position within a defined
market. 123 Otherwise, a price increment in his products will lead consumers
to buy their cars from his competitors. In any case, Motta suggests that, in
the real world, nearly all firms will have enough market power to act as an
incentive to discriminate. 124 The car market is arguably one of the most
competitive markets in the European Union, yet for the past three years the
automobile industry has been ranked among the three "most troubled
industries" in a poll conducted by the Turnaround Management
Association. 125 To anyone familiar with the history of the industry, this
decline would remind them of that suffered by the U.S. carmakers in the
1960s. Similarly to what is happening now in Europe, the convergence of
factors such as macroeconomic instability, changes in consumer
preferences, a rise in the price of oil, an increase in foreign competition, and
intense governmental regulatory activity became a significant burden on the
industry, and led to mergers which transformed the structure of the
market.126 By the 1960s the so-called "big three" U.S. assemblers-GM,
127
Ford, and Chrysler-held the market largely to themselves. Most of the
smaller independent manufacturers such as Kaiser, Willys, Studebaker, and
American Motors were forced to merge or close down, leaving the industry
in the hands of the Big Three.
At the moment, all the indicators suggest that the European car
industry is also experiencing similarly difficult times, and as a consequence
it is likely that its structure will be irrevocably transformed within the next
decade or so. Its position in the midst of pressure from firms in other parts
of the world has, in the author's view, also contributed to the decrease in car
price differentials across Europe, as foreign competitors have forced
Europe's established brands to adjust their prices to remain in the picture.
Given its importance, this part examines the competitiveness of the
European Union's car manufacturers in order to predict how they will
subsist in the years to come, and if there is a role for the European legislator
in sustaining them.
Resource allocation efficiency is highlighted, for instance. See generally KARL E. CASE ET
AL., ECONOMICS: EUROPEAN EDITION 24 (1999); Joan Bodoff, Competition Policies of the
U.S. and the EEC: An Overview, 1984 ECLR 51, 52.
123 MOTTA, supra note 13, at 492 n.107.
124 Id.
125 See No Change Predicted in Top 3 Struggling Industries for 2005, BUs. CREDIT, Feb.
1, 2005, at 56, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/sales/335682-1.html.
126 Lane Kenworthy, Stewart Macaulay & Joel Rogers (1996), "The More Things
Change... ": Business Litigation and Governance in the American Automobile Industry, 21
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 631 (1996).
127 GM was the result of a merger between 200 garage-sized firms. See GM History-A
Brief History, http://media.gm.com/corpcom/history/intro.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
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1. Competition in the European Car Market
Competitiveness is usually defined as the ability to gain or defend
market share on the international market by relying on price and/or the
quality of goods produced. The car market is, in this sense, a highly
competitive market, and according to the European Parliament, this might
cause trouble for car manufacturers in Europe. 28 Most of these problems
are derived from the pressure of the Japanese, and to a lesser extent the
American, car industries, 129 at a time when European car makers have less
financial power than their competitors from abroad and when a rise in the
number of new manufacturers in Asia with important export potential is
developing. 130 In global terms, an expansion for the automobile industry is
expected over the next decade, in particular with the motorization of China
and India. It is predicted that more cars will be made in the next twenty
years than in the entire history of the industry. 131 However, in the last few
years concerns about the future of the European car industry have emerged.
In its 2004 Competitiveness Report, the European Commission warned
about the delay in developing green technologies already mastered by
Japanese makers. 132 The competitiveness of the European car industry is
dependent upon factors such as production costs, technological and
organizational innovation, regulatory framework, and macroeconomic
conditions, which, according to the report, place a large question mark on
the future of the sector.
1 33
The EU car market is relatively competitive, without one single
manufacturer holding a clear dominant position. 134 Kenworthy, Macaulay,
and Rogers have highlighted the effects of competition on firms' behavior:
"Competition... increases firms' attention to short-run bottom line
concerns. Firms can less easily afford to forego opportunities for
128 See European Parliament Fact Sheets-The Automobile Industry, http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/facts/4 7_4 en.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
129 Nissan, Japan's second largest carmaker, recorded a 15 percent increase in revenue
last year, which meant that net profit rose by 1.7 percent. Honda's net profit for the same
year rose by 4.7 percent. Both companies were helped by strong sales in America and a
growing position in Europe. World this Week, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2005, at 9. In contrast,
General Motors lost $1.1 billion in its worst quarterly loss since 1992. Ford Motors said
quarterly net income fell by 38 percent to $1.21 billion. World this Week, ECONOMIST, Apr.
23, 2005, at 7.
130 See European Parliament Fact Sheets, supra note 128.
131 Extinction of the Predator, supra note 7, at 71.
132 EU Car Sector Successful but Not "Green" Enough, EURACTIV, Dec. 1, 2004,
available at http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-132985-16&type=News.
133 Id.
134 It would be more adequate to talk about "car markets" as there are different relevant
(product) markets that can be distinguished. For a detailed classification see Commission
Decision 2002/758, Mercedes-Benz, 2002 O.J. (L 257) 1 (EC).
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immediate gain, and their room for maneuver, and ability to sustain the
costs of constructing and applying alternative sanctions, are reduced.
Competition also raises the relative stakes in individual transactions by
reducing margins of permissible error."'135 There are many competitors in
the game, and this, according to 19th Century Neoclassical economics,
would in itself reflect the existence of competition. However, if there are
market imperfections, then the level of competition of that market may be
limited, despite the presence of many actors. For instance, if manufacturers
are exchanging information and fixing prices between them, then they will
be creating monopoly-like effects. In the case of the car sector, there have
been numerous mergers over the years, and horizontal cooperation is
frequent. Nonetheless, it is questionable that these mergers have restricted
the competitiveness of the market or harmed competition, particularly since
Europe's firms face fierce competition from manufacturers all around the
world and thus would be unlikely to survive if they decided to artificially
raise prices.
According to Garel Rhys, director of the Centre for Automotive
Industry Research at Cardiff University, "[T]oday's car plants will need [to
be] renewed, retooled, refurbished and replaced to remain competitive.'
This is quite a challenge for European carmakers, in particular given the
peculiar structure of the sector. Many of the established producers have
merged over the years as a short-term solution to confront competition, but
are still dragging their operating difficulties, much to the benefit of new
entrants.
2. Difficulties Faced by European Car Manufacturers
Horizontal cooperation 137 and mergers in the car industry are frequent.
Even so, they may go by unnoticed for some as many brand names still
remain-fifty-eight brands survive among the ten largest manufacturers.
The five largest company alliances account for 75 percent of the global
market. Adding the next five, it rises to 90 percent. In Europe, alliances
between firms are said to have "bundled" brands. For instance, British
Leyland was the resulting brand of the merger of virtually all the British car
industry, while in France Citroen was swallowed by Peugeot (despite its
survival as a brand). Volkswagen used its acquisitions of Seat and Skoda to
expand geographically towards Spain and Eastern Europe. The takeover of
.5 Kenworthy, Macaulay, & Rogers, supra note 126, at 633.
136 Extinction of the Predator, supra note 7, at 71-73.
137 As regards horizontal cooperation, see, for example, the Ford/Volkswagen
Commission Decision, 93/49, 1993 O.J. (L 20) 14, 15-16, which exempted a joint venture
agreement between those manufacturers on integration grounds and an attempt to create new
jobs and promote a "harmonious development of the Community and the reduction of
regional disparities."
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Chrysler by Daimler-Benz in 1998 and the alliance of Renault and Nissan
in 1999 are the most recent changes and the two biggest consolidation deals
in the industry.
It seems the strategy of consolidating behind the brands has not been
entirely successful, as recent studies prove an inverse correlation between
the number of brands a firm possesses and profitability. 138 In fact, the most
recent facts reflect that brands are now more cautious before entering into
mergers or other types of horizontal cooperation. 139 Mergers changed the
privileged position European car manufacturers had enjoyed for many
years. According to the Commission's above-mentioned Competitiveness
Report, 40 Europe still has the largest single market for passenger cars in the
world and is well positioned to leverage economies of scale and scope with
42 percent of global production coming from the European Union in 2002.
So far, the fact that many consumers have remained loyal to European
brands has shielded the European Union from excessive international
competition. As a result, European firms remain dominant in many relevant
product markets (particularly luxury cars) and are rather well positioned in
emerging markets such as China. Qualified affordable labor is abundant
thanks to the European Union's recent expansions towards Central and
Eastern Europe. 141
However, in terms of labor productivity, employees are generally more
costly and less flexible in the European Union than in other regions.
Growth in the European Union is slow compared to other major world
regions and is further hindered by a relative fragmentation of the European
Union's single market, especially relative to differing vehicle taxation in the
Member States. One major challenge to growth lies in the advantage
Japanese car makers have gained in developing environmentally friendly
technologies. Another challenge to the industry is the rise of mighty
superstore chains, which have eroded the disproportionate power carmakers
once had over their dealiers. 142 It seems that a shift in power is taking place
138 Extinction of the Predator, supra note 7, at 71-73.
139 The possible merger between MAN and Scania has been delayed on several
occasions, and no interest in the takeover of Fiat has been expressed, despite the company's
troubles. Fiat nevertheless entered into a joint venture with India's Tata Motors in late 2006.
See Industry News, UK AUTO INDUSTRY, Jan. 12, 2007, available at http://www.autoindustry
.co.uk/news/day- 12_1 2007# 12-01-07_13.
140 EU Car Sector Successful but Not "Green " Enough, supra note 132.
141 Ten new members entered the European Union on May 1, 2004: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, and Cyprus.
Romania and Bulgaria joined on January 1, 2007.
142 For instance, see Jules Stuyck & Ton Van Dyck, EC Competition Rules on Vertical
Restrictions and the Realities of a Changing Retail Sector (2002), reprinted in 5 PRIVATE
LAW IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT SERIES, THE FORTHCOMING EC DIRECTIVE ON UNFAIR
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 131-32 (Martijn Hesselink et al. eds., 2004). Nevertheless, the
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in the relationship between retailers and manufacturers, with the power is
being put into the hands of these large retailers, facilitated by technological
innovation and the information technology revolution. The car sector has
remained, for the most part, an exception to this tendency. The relationship
between manufacturers and dealers in this sector has been referred to as a
"relation of adhesion,"' 143 for it is the manufacturer who defines the general
clauses and the specific contractual obligations and has the unilateral right
to change the conditions. But this appears to be gradually changing. In the
United States, it is now common to see huge car retailers that sell more than
one brand and have many branches, and in the European Union the new
regulatory framework provided by Regulation 1400/2002 should open up
similar possibilities for European car dealers. 144 In this sense, the new
changes address the creation of a new type of dealer with as much
bargaining power as the manufacturer when enacting dealership contracts.
Pressure on EU carmakers is therefore mounting, and even more so
considering the fines that since the late 1990s have been imposed on
manufacturers-the latest being the EUR 49.5 million fine on French
manufacturer Peugeot for barring dealers in the Netherlands from selling
their products to consumers in other EU countries.
Ivan Hodac, Secretary General of the ACEA, claims that product
regulations imposed by the European Union are worrying for carmakers.1
45
Some of the rules even seem contradictory, as they demand both greater
fuel efficiency and safety enhancements, which make cars heavier and
require more power. He suggests that the European Commission
institutions should concentrate on ensuring better quality regulation by
carrying out integrated impact assessments, particularly given the newly
enlarged Union. He proposes a series of solutions: "The rapid completion of
the internal market in the automotive sector, including fiscal harmonisation
of vehicle and fuel taxes, alongside further development of efficient road
infrastructure is essential.... Lastly, more flexible labour conditions to
boost competitiveness should be considered." 4 6 It seems therefore that the
abundant product regulation harmonizing standards across the European
Union is proving a heavy burden on the manufacturers.
Despite these claims, recent data seem to indicate a less worrying
authors conclude that the power of manufacturers over their retailers is much greater. Id. at
168.
143 Christian Joerges, Relational Contract Theory in a Comparative Perspective:
Tensions Between Contract and Antitrust Principles in the Assessment of Contract Relations
Between Automobile Manufacturers and their Dealers in Germany, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 581,
584 (1985) (citing Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691,
770-71 (1974)).
"4 See infra Part IV.C.2.
145 See EU Car Sector Successful but Not "Green " Enough, supra note 133.
146 Id.
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picture for the industry. A survey by AC Nielsen 14 7-a company dedicated
to providing worldwide marketing information-recently reflected that the
demand for brand-new cars in Europe is increasing, and that European
brands are still the favorite among European consumers.
148
3. Proposed Solutions
Goldberg and Verboven believe that the remaining differentials call for
structural interventions. 149 In the same line, regulation seems to be the best
way for the Commission to tackle the difficulties envisaged by this crucial
European industry. The Commission recommends putting in place the
appropriate regulation to anticipate technology trends, such as tax policies
to provide customers with the incentives to buy advanced technologies and
further align the Member States' vehicle tax system. Recently, ministers
meeting at the EU Competitiveness Council on November 25, 2006
welcomed the conclusions of a separate report, saying that future regulatory
proposals in the European Union's automotive sectors "should undergo
comprehensive impact assessments taking into account the cumulative
burden of the existing regulatory framework for the automotive
industry.' 150 They supported the Commission setting up a high level group
to address issues of importance to the automotive industry's
competitiveness.
CARS 21, a high level group to address key issues for the
competitiveness of the automotive industry, was set up by Commissioner
Verheugen in January 2005.51 It intends to improve the regulatory
framework of the car industry and prepare it for the competitive challenges
of the next decade. The group is composed of three commissioners, five
ministers from Member States, two MEPs, five CEOs from the automobile
147 The study consisted of a worldwide online consumer survey, polling over 14,000
people through the Internet in twenty-eight countries across the Asia Pacific, Europe, and the
United States.
148 See Press Release, ACNielsen, New Survey Names Volkswagen as Leading Car
Brand in Europe (Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www2.acnielsen.com/news/20050404
_eu.shtml.
149 See Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1, at 516-18.
Iso See EU Car Sector Successful But Not "Green "Enough, supra note 132.
151 Opinions on CARS 21 have been issued by the different representatives of the
stakeholders. See, e.g., Press Release, BEUC, supra note 39; Press Release, European
Automobile Manufacturers' Association, EU Commission Launches CARS 21 Initiative: A
Positive Step Towards Better Competitiveness and Sustainability in Europe (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.acea.be/files/20050066.pdf, Press Release, International Federation
of Automotive Aftermarket Distributors, "CARS 21" Is Endangering Consumer Choice in
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industry and one from the petroleum industry, one automotive supplier, one
trade union, one motorist organization, and one environmental think-tank.
At this point, it is still too early to evaluate the outcome of its work, but it
has already received some criticism from consumer organizations and other
industry sectors connected to the automotive sector for being tailor-made to
fit EU manufacturers' interests. 152 The group has, however, adopted a ten-
year plan of action to simplify EU automotive regulation, as well as to
improve safety and reduce pollution. 153 To adequately evaluate the recent
line of action of the Commission, it is necessary to place it in the broader
context of the European regulation of the car sector, which is examined
below.
IV. IS THERE A ROLE FOR INTERVENTION?
When the car distribution regime was being revised in the early 2000s,
former Commissioner Monti insisted that car price differentials and
possible obstacles to parallel trade remain a high priority for the
Commission. Car price differentials seem to have given the Commission
wings to take action in this sector of the economy. EU law has traditionally
looked upon price discrimination between Member States with mistrust.
4
Indeed, some practices to prevent the flow of parallel imports are believed
to be among the most harmful offenses to competition, and are therefore
practically treated as a per se prohibition. At its most basic, EU law in the
car sector has, mainly through competition provisions, focused mainly on
limiting car price differentials by protecting parallel imports-whereby
retailers (and consumers) to buy the products in the cheaper markets and
then resell them in the most expensive countries at lower prices than the
official retailers in that territory. The Commission acts in a belief that if
parallel trade is upheld, then it will be unfeasible for manufacturers to price
discriminate, 55 and the segmentation of markets will disappear. The
European antitrust rules also appear to aim at protecting dealers and
consumers from the power of manufacturers, and this is particularly clear in
152 See EurActiv.com, EU Carmakers Square Up to Critics in Parliament, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-carmakers-square-critics-parliament/article-
145384.
13 For full text of the 10-year plan, see European Commission, Enterprise and Industry
Directorate-General, CARS 21: A Competitive Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st
Century 43-58 (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesback
ground/competitiveness/cars2l finalreport.pdf. See also BEUC, The Automotive Regulatory
Framework of the Next 10 Years-BEUC Comments, BEUC/169/2005 (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/stakeholder-Con
sultation/beuc.pdf.
154 MOTTA, supra note 13, at 495.
155 Pigou's second essential condition, the absence of arbitrage, would not be met. See
supra Part ILA; see also PIGou, supra note 23.
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the secondary legislation that comes mainly in the form of regulations.
Antitrust rules governing this sector coexist with the many directives that
aim at harmonizing product requirements across the European Union in
order to grant the free movement of goods within the European
Community. 156
In the context of antitrust law, EC competition provisions relating to
the car industry clearly seem to be addressed at promoting market
integration, which has generally been recognized as one of the main
objectives of EC competition policy. 157 It is more questionable however
that they are pursuing economic welfare and efficiency, which are arguably
the main goals of antitrust policy. Economic efficiency should be
understood as the highest possible level of economic welfare, the sum of
consumer and producer welfare. In this sense, leaving aside integration
pursuits, the actions of the Commission indeed appear to be addressed at
maximizing consumer welfare and protecting car dealers in the dealer-
manufacturer relationship. However, we might ask ourselves what happens
with producer welfare.
Given the somewhat uncomfortable position European manufacturers
are currently experiencing, strict competition rules that do not factor in their
interests might impose a burden that makes it impossible for them to
survive. It is not the task of the European competition legislator to protect
inefficient firms;1 58 this would encourage the inefficient allocation of
resources and lead to high prices in the long run. However, the
Commission has been particularly harsh on territorial restrictions in car
distribution agreements, differing in this aspect from the standard U.S.
Chicago School approach that vertical restraints only become an issue when
there is horizontal market power. To adequately assess the European
competition rules, they must be analyzed in the context of economic and
legal theory and critically examined for their impact on economic welfare.
A. The European Union's Action in the Car Sector
EU law has addressed the issue of price discrimination in the European
sector via two principal lines of action: integration and competition. For the
integration of markets, a number of Commission directives intending to
harmonize essential product requirements across the European Union were
set out in the 1970s and eventually replaced national product regulation.
159
156 According to EC Treaty art. 249, a directive is only binding as to the result to be
achieved, and leaves it up to the Member States to choose the means to achieve that result
(within a specific period of time).
157 See MOTTA, supra note 13, at 23-24.
158 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
159 In 1993, the directives fully replaced national systems. See Goldberg & Verboven,
supra note 1, at 492.
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In this way, divergent national standards, which could lead to higher prices
in some Member States and serve as an obstacle to the free movement of
goods, are now harmonized for the most part. As concerns competition,
browsing through the European Union's website1 60 for this policy can give
an idea of what the line of action of the Directorate General for Competition
of the Commission ("DG COMP") reflects regarding the car sector.
Besides the many reports and press releases previously analyzed, there is
abundant information on fines that have been imposed on manufacturers for
not complying with Regulation 1400/2002, in particular for trying to
impede cross-border sales. 
1 6
In its policy, the Commission seems to be inspired by the "law of one
price,"' 162 which establishes that if different prices are charged for similar
goods at different locations, someone will be tempted to buy products at
cheap locations and then resell them at places where prices are higher. In
the long run, this would force prices to converge. According to this
premise, unjustified car price differentials should tend to disappear much
faster than what has in fact happened. There could be two possible
explanations for this. First, the lack of price convergence could lead to
thinking that manufacturers were somehow impeding this tendency.
Second, the "border effect" referred to earlier on could in itself prevent
convergence. 163 The reader must note that empirical evidence seems to
suggest that the law of one price does not always reflect what happens in
reality, as prices tend to remain heterogeneous.'
The Commission seems to act on a belief that price discrimination is
wrong, and that it is manufacturers who block price convergence, utilizing
their distribution agreements to do so. Not every territorial or customer
allocation is intended to facilitate price discrimination, but everyone has
that potential by segmenting the market for the product. As Joerges
explains, "orderly marketing plans have often utilized arrangements
160 EUROPA, Activities of the European Union--Competition, http://europa.eu/pol/comp
/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
161 According to EC press releases, an investigation was launched into BMW and GM to
find out if they have been allowing their dealers to deal with other brands and therefore lead
to multi-branding, as Commission Regulation 1400/2002 establishes. Press Release,
European Comm'n, Competition: Commission Welcomes Changes to BMW's Distribution
and Servicing Agreements (Mar. 13, 2006), IP/06/302, available at http://europa.eu/rapid
/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/302&format=PDF&aged= &Ianguage=EN&guiL
anguage en; Press Release, European Comm'n, Competition: Commission Welcomes
Changes to General Motors' Distribution and Servicing Agreements (Mar. 13, 2006),
IP/06/303, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/303
&format=PDF&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
162 See Maier, supra note 27, at 1.
163 See supra Part II.C.6.
164 See Maier, supra note 27, at 1; see also MOTTA, supra note 13.
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whereby dealers agree to sell the product only within specified territories
and to solicit business only from specified classes of customers."1 65 These
restrictions, which are imposed on the buyer, facilitate price discrimination.
A producer or wholesaler that is able to compel the retailer to take its
product at a higher price than the same products sold to nearby retailers
increases profits to the supplier by segmenting the geographic market into
small territories with unique prices. In a context of building up a single
market and trying to achieve integration, the reasons for concern are
obvious.
B. Distribution Agreements Under EC Competition Policy and U.S.
Antitrust
The distribution of brand new motor vehicles in Europe and America
is traditionally arranged through franchising agreements between
manufacturers and their dealers.166 In fact, it was precisely in the context of
the distribution of motor vehicles that franchises emerged as a way of
distributing commercial goods in the United States.1 67  Sullivan defines
these contracts as "license[s] granting the right to trade under the mark and
name, provided that the licensor's standards for the business are
maintained.' 68  The distinctive feature of these agreements is that
customers perceive an identification between franchisor and franchisee.
169
They create a network of selected retailers in each community (in the case
of the European Union, each Member State) who are in charge of ensuring
that these products efficiently reach the end consumer. In Europe, selective
and exclusive distribution ("SED") systems exist for the channeling of new
cars. Exclusivity implies that the manufacturer only appoints one retailer
who can sell his brand within an allotted territory, and the retailer in turn
agrees to sell only the manufacturer's products. Selective distribution
allows a certain type of retailer, who meets the conditions laid out by the
165 See Joerges, supra note 143, at 584, 594; see also White Motor Co. v. United Status,
372 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).
166 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 130 (1966)
("Chevrolets are ordinarily distributed by dealers operating under a franchise from General
Motors"); see also The Automobile Dealers Act, Note, 9 STAN. L.R. 760, 760 (1957).
167 ENRIQUE CARLOS DiEZ DE CATRO, ANTONIO NAVANO GARCiA & FRANCISCO JAVIER
RONDAN CATALU&A, EL SISTEMA DE FRANQUICIA: FUNDAMENTOS TEORICOS Y PRACTICOS
(Ediciones Pirdmide 2005).
168 LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 401 (W. Publ'g Co. 1977).
169 Id. at 400. The degree of identification may vary. Sullivan distinguishes three types of
franchise agreements: The ones where the relationship is merely that of a buyer-seller, those
where the retailer is a non-exclusive authorized retailer that operates under the
manufacturer's guidance but does not look to be one entity in the eyes of the consumer, and
finally where most would assume that the manufacturer operates the outlet (the most
frequent type).
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manufacturer, to distribute his goods. 70 Industry representatives have long
claimed that there are multiple reasons that justify the use of franchising in
the distribution of cars. Through a franchise contract, for instance, the
manufacturer can exert considerable control over the process of distribution.
Beyond that, a limited number of dealers is usually the most efficient means
of entering a market and servicing the product. Also, franchised dealers are
usually given the capacity to build and maintain a strong retail organization.
According to manufacturers, the nature of the relationship is of mutual
dependence, as each party has a substantial interest in the other's
conduct. 7 1 They also argue that in this game the consumer benefits, since
if the products are delivered in the most efficient way, prices should be
lower and the service ought to be better.
As is usually the case, reality can differ from theory. In order to
understand what the defacto situation is, it is necessary to look further back
into the origins of franchises in the auto industry. Independent dealerships
arose as a consequence of mass automobile production. 172  The dealer
assumed increasing responsibilities and performed successively greater
functions, but he did not become an independent merchant. The
manufacturers wanted them as "exclusive agents."' 173  Eventually,
manufacturers were compelled to pay increasing attention to retailing
problems. They learned that the dealer is a "principal competitive weapon,"
because upon the sales of the dealer "rests the success or failure of the
whole manufacturing process," and since automobile sales usually require
considerable service, demonstration, and the post-sale service,
manufacturers check the performance of these tasks. 74  This "idyllic"
situation of mutual dependence is not so even in the real world, and
manufacturers have traditionally held an overly strong position in relation
to their dealers.
Franchises have long been criticized for their one-sidedness. They
have often been defined as de facto contracts of adhesion enacted
overwhelmingly in favor of manufacturers. 175  Carmakers have used
franchising as a means to gain maximum control over the management of
the dealers' business. Yet the importance of dealers is immense and the
170 On this distinction, see MOTTA, supra note 13, at 304.
171 Paul Davis, Retrieving Corporate Policy: Managing Minority Dissent, 5 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. Bus. IN Soc'y 64 (2005).
172 See Kenworthy, Macaulay & Rogers, supra note 126, at 657.173 The dealer has been referred to as an exclusive agent since the early days of
franchising. See Illsley v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 195 Ill. App. 572 (1915); Garfield v.
Peerless Motor Car Co., 75 N.E. 695 (1905).
174 JOSEPH CORNWALL PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 108 (Harvard
Univ. Press, 1955).
175 For a criticism of this abusive character of franchises, see Joerges, supra note 143.
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success of a certain brand in an allotted territory depends very much on how
the dealer performs his functions, as we as consumers normally associate
the manufacturer with the person we have direct contact with when
purchasing the vehicles. Even though he might not legally be considered an
agent, he is normally regarded by the general public as the manufacturer's
representative. 76 In this context, the new EC competition rules for car
distribution reflect a concern for the middle man.1 7  The Commission
therefore indirectly appears to question economic efficiency as the only
goal for competition policy. As Komesar expresses, Pareto's efficient
transactions can be truly unjust.1 78  For instance, slavery might be
considered efficient in some respects, yet given its unfair connotations it is
forbidden in today's society. There are arguments other than economic
efficiency present in regulation which should be considered. In the
automobile industry, the situation of unfairness that affects the dealer could
in this sense invalidate the efficiency argument.
Apart from these issues, an issue arises in the sphere of competition
policy, and which is related to the maintenance of price discrimination. The
contracts between manufacturers and their dealers have traditionally
established exclusive rights for both sides. Since the manufacturer
generally requested the dealers to sell only his products, the dealer also
wished to have the privilege of being the only person authorized to sell the
manufacturer's brand in the allotted territory. While the former problem
could be solved to a certain extent using contract law, the latter is more
complicated as there is a conflict of interests. On one hand, the dealer's
weak position could be compensated by rewarding him with territorial
exclusivity and protection from free-riders who might be able to offer the
same product at a lower price by taking advantage of the dealer's
investments and efforts. On the other, this exclusivity tends to divide the
territory of the European Union along national lines and allows
manufacturers to price discriminate. This protection of the dealer, as
Kessler points out, could happen at the consumer's expense.
1 79
In the United States, these matters are seen under a different light. The
preoccupation about the unbalanced manufacturer-dealer relationship was
reflected in early U.S. antitrust jurisprudence in the prevailing "free trader
doctrine'' 80 Until the 1960s, rigid legal rules against vertical restraints,
176 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Practices of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Automobile Marketing Practices (84th Cong., 2d sess.,
Sen. Res. 13 continued by Sen. Res. 163, Washington, D.C., 1956).
177 See supra Part IV.C.
178 KOMESAR, supra note 15, at 33.
179 Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1189 (1957).
180 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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which applied to distribution agreements in the car sector, were observed,
intended to preserve the freedom and autonomy of distributors . 8 1 Retailers
were seen as people without power in relation to manufacturers. However,
as world competition became robust and the quest for efficiency and
competitiveness took center stage, U.S. law and policy changed. The free-
rider doctrine was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Sylvania
case. 182 The Court observed that when a single producer chooses to impose
a vertical restraint, the restraint is nearly always efficient, increasing output
, and good for consumers, and that government restraints (i.e., antitrust
rules) against the freedom of firms to choose how to distribute their own
product are nearly always inefficient, output decreasing, and harmful to
consumers. 183 As for the possibility of manufacturers to price discriminate
via the appointment of exclusive and selected dealers, there is no
prohibition of excessive pricing in U.S. antitrust law, not even by
monopolists or dominant firms. The American view is that pricing and its
excesses should be left to the market. Excessive pricing usually attracts
new players to enter the market, and therefore eventually this imperfection
will correct itself. Only when that is not the case is there a role for
regulation, but the general rule is that freedom of pricing works better for
the public than antitrust intervention, which is likely to reduce incentives to
create and compete, upsetting the balance of risk and reward. 1
84
C. The Application of EC Competition Law to Car Distribution Contracts
1. Overview of the Regime
As a consequence of the potential threat posed by exclusive and
selective distribution systems to the single market and competition, the
Commission is usually suspicious of car manufacturer-dealer agreements,
and this has affected the manner in which the EC Treaty's competition law
provisions have been applied, and how the specific regulation has
developed. As regards the former, Article 81(1) contains a general
prohibition of agreements which affect more than one EU Member State
which may have the "object or effect" of distorting competition in any
181 Eleanor M. Fox, Parallel Imports, the Intrabrand/Interbrand Competition Paradigm,
and the Hidden Gap Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust, 25 FORDHAM INT'L
LJ. 982, 983 (2001-2002).
182 Cont'l T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-59 (1977). But see
Toys"R"Us, Inc. v FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2000) (where the Court established
that the free-rider rationale for vertical restraints loses its force when dealers are being
compensated for providing customer services).
183 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988).
184 Fox, supra note 181, at 984 (relying on Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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way. 85  Obviously, any agreement, by its nature, restricts, and this
prohibition has consistently been broadly interpreted to catch most
agreements between firms. Article 81(2) provides the sanction for those
agreements which are considered to fall within the scope of the prohibition:
they will be null.
186
Agreements can nonetheless escape this sanction on the basis of
Article 81(3) EC, which provides an exemption for those agreements that
may serve to improve "the production or distribution of goods or to
promot[e] technical or economic progress," when they benefit consumers
and provided they do not impose unreasonable restrictions 87 or give the
firms involved the capability to eliminate competition. The current system
allows the Commission, national competition authorities, and courts to
grant an exemption. In addition, a number of block exemptions exist
which, provided the requirements laid out in them are met, automatically
exempt certain types of agreements. Regulation 1400/2002 is the current
block exemption regulation for motor vehicle distribution agreements.188
Its key points are summarized below.
2. Key Elements of Regulation 1400/2002
On July 31 st 2002, the Commission adopted a new block exemption
regulation for the distribution of motor vehicles, Regulation 1400/2002.189
This exemption replaced Regulation 1475/95-itself a reform of Regulation
123/85, the first ever block exemption for the car sector.' 90  The new
sectoral regulation follows to some extent the U.S. "new economics," which
reflects a debilitation of the ban of vertical competition restraints, in line
with other Commission reforms regarding vertical agreements. 91
"Flexibility for distribution" is probably the best way to describe the
rationale of Regulation 1400/2002, as it provides an attempt to liberalize
distribution with a view to minimizing the existence of price differentials.
Until 1985, there was no specific regulation of the car sector in
185 EC Treaty, art. 8 1(1), supra note 5.
186 Id. art. 81(2).
187 Id. art. 81(3). The text of the provision refers to "restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of [the objectives laid out in Article 81(3)]." Id. This would
put one in mind of those restrictions that the U.S. courts have named "naked restraints,"
which are those which serve no other purpose other than restricting competition, and are
considered per se illegal. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 729; see also United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
188 Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9.
189 Id.
190 See Evaluation of Regulation 1475/95, supra note 66; see also Commission
Regulation 1475/95, supra note 9.
191 See Klaus Tonner, Book Review, 10 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 223 (1987).
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Europe. It was common practice that manufacturers and suppliers would
forbid their dealers from reselling their cars, especially if those cars would
then be exported by the reseller. Apart from this, a series of additional
measures ensured that parallel imports were virtually impossible: high
deposits had to be paid, deliveries were delayed, and after-sales would not
be provided to imported cars.1 92 Commission Regulation 123/85 exempted
some of these practices, as it permitted a system of selective and exclusive
distribution for motor vehicles, which meant that the dealers could not
engage in cross-border arbitrage activities to exploit international price
differentials. 193 In theory, European consumers were free to purchase their
cars anywhere in the European Union and benefit from price differentials,
but in practice cross-border sales were made very difficult by these
measures. In 1995, Regulation 1475/95 provided a renewal of the system,
which did not include radical changes due to strong pressure exerted by the
car manufacturers' lobby.194 Since the 1990s however, efforts were made to
guarantee that the EC competition law provisions were adequately enforced,
and fines were imposed on those manufacturers who impeded their dealers
from selling to consumers from other Member States. 1
95
Regulation 1400/2002, the block exemption currently in force, finally
introduced some important changes. For instance, the link between sales
and after-sales is finally broken, and dealers must be allowed to subcontract
to authorized repairers. Previously, dealers were obliged to provide after-
sales services. This creates at least the theoretical possibility for sales to be
made by supermarkets and Internet operators, who would otherwise be
incapable of carrying out such repair and maintenance. Besides, dealers are
now allowed to sell more than one brand of cars. Multi-branding--dealers
selling more than one brand of cars-was not permitted under the previous
Regulation. 196  This is yet another attempt to balance the relationship
between manufacturers and dealers. 197 Also, market power is now crucial
when determining the validity of a distribution agreement. It is assumed
that most restrictions are unlikely to cause any substantial harm to
competition unless the supplier 98 has a market share exceeding 30 percent
192 Goldberg & Verboven, supra note 1.
193 Id.
194 Commission Regulation 1475/95, supra note 9.
195 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
196 Commission Regulation 1475/95, supra note 9.
197 In the U.S., "supermarket" sales and multi-branding have been common practices for
many years. Examples can be found as early as in the 1950s. For instance, Chevrolet
dealers resold new cars to discount houses, which provided a wide range of goods and
services in a manner very similar to department stores. They also sold a variety of makes
and models from different manufacturers. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127 (1966).
198 In the case of exclusive supply obligations, it will be the buyer's market share that is
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within the specific relevant market. 199 Therefore, those agreements below
that threshold will be able to benefit from the exemption if they meet the
other requirements. Moreover, the market share can be up to 40 percent for
quantitative selective distribution, 200 and there will be no threshold for
qualitative selective distribution.20' That is, these distribution systems will
be able to benefit from the exemption regardless of the market power of the
manufacturer-the per se validity of such agreements is thus recognized.0 2
Regarding SED systems in general, both selective and exclusive
distribution are still permitted. In the former, when dealers are chosen
following qualitative criteria, manufacturers cannot place a ceiling on the
number of dealers. Despite criticisms of SED systems, 0 3 the Commission
argues that they are considered adequate for "expensive and exclusive
goods such as motor vehicles. 20 4 The lobbying of the industry, which had
for so long prevented any evolutions in the policy, could not be completely
ignored. The current block exemption implies an attempt to bring the
specific rules for the motor vehicle sector in line with the Commission's
general rules on vertical agreements that apply to all other sectors.
However, the car sector is still crucial in the European economy, and the
strong lobbying on the part of industry representatives, dealer associations,
and consumers managed to keep a slightly stricter regime.
To sum up, the new rules reflect concerns not only for price
differentials, but also for market integration and the protection of the
middleman. Regulation 1400/2002 has introduced some crucial changes,
and opened up the door for progress and evolution in car distribution. From
the point of view of economic efficiency, the changes imply a more
balanced consideration of consumer-producer-dealer welfare than the
previous regime. However, the system still departs from the assumption
that these dealership contracts are caught by the prohibition contained in
Article .81(1) EC. The question that pops into one's mind is whether it
would have been better to opt for a narrower interpretation of the
prohibition, whereby a priori these agreements would not be considered to
breach this provision and thus do not need to be exempted at all. The
existence of a general regime for vertical agreements-Commission
considered. See Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9, art. 3(2); infra Part V.
199 See Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9, art. 3(2), para. 2.
200 Id.
201 Id. para. 3.
202 An exception is those agreements that contain a hardcore restriction. See id. at art. 4.
203 See Gillen, supra note 52 ("[T]he adoption of the SED system coupled with [the
suppliers'] reluctance to compete with each other when setting the level of their
recommended retail prices and their lack of price transparency operated against the public
interest.").
204 Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9, at para. 12 (explanatory note).
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Regulation 2700/1999 2 05-places a further question mark on the necessity
of the sector-specific regime: why are car distribution contracts unable to
benefit from this general exemption for similar contracts for the distribution
of other consumer goods?
D. Benefits and Costs of Sectoral Regulation as a Corrector of Market
Imperfections
The Commission, when arguing in favor of a differentiated treatment
for distribution agreements, uses justifications related to the special nature
of the products being delivered. It claims that there are certain
characteristics which make the car sector unique and hence arises the need
for differentiated treatment. These peculiarities appear on the Report on
the Evaluation of Regulation 1475/95,206 and have been re-emphasized in
Regulation 1400/2002.207 Indeed, cars are obviously technologically
complex products, and need to be dealt with by experts both at the time of
purchase and when providing any after-sales service. Besides, the price of a
motor vehicle is high, and during the life of a car it is estimated that one
spends as much money on repairs and spare parts as the original price of the
product. Safety standards are also essential, since vehicles should guarantee
security on the road to the maximum extent possible. Finally, brand image
needs protection, therefore it is justifiable to a certain extent that the
manufacturer only chooses to sell his or her products through appointed
dealers.
In Regulation 1400/2002, the Commission insists on the need for
stricter rules for the sector, especially given the fact that traditionally
selective and exclusive distribution systems are used, and therefore it is
necessary to prevent the possible abuses that these practices may imply.
20 8
Despite these characteristics, 209 it is still questionable that they are enough
to justify the existence of a specific regime for these consumer goods. If
one takes a look at other consumer goods, some other products have very
similar features-in particular those which have emerged with the boost of
205 Council Regulation 2700/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 327) 1 (EC).
206 Evaluation of Regulation No. 1475/95, supra note 66.
207 Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9 recital 21. Other peculiarities and explanations
can be found scattered around the rest of the recitals. For instance, how stricter rules are
rcquired for this sector (recital 2), that dealers have a particularly disadvantageous position
in the dealer-manufacturer relationship (recital 9) or how expert after-sales and servicing of
these products is of particular importance in this sector (recital 22).
208 This idea is highlighted in the third recital of the draft. Regulation 1400/2002, supra
note 9 recital 3.
209 See Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9 recital 21 ("[M]otor vehicles are expensive
and technically complex mobile goods which require repair and maintenance at regular and
irregular intervals.").
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technology-and yet they do not benefit from such a regulation. 21 1 Also, it
is only the distribution of new cars that is affected by these rules, while
used cars are not within the scope of the block exemption. 21' The reason
for this, quite clearly, is that SED systems are only used for the sale of
brand new vehicles, and independent resellers can indeed engage in cross-
border arbitrage in the second-hand market. Therefore, the inherent
negative effects of these SED systems do not present themselves in the
sales of used vehicles.
Justifications for the existence of sectoral regulation and government
intervention in markets can be found in the field of microeconomic theory.
The "Theory of Second Best" ("TSB"),21 2 for instance, can be used by the
legislator to establish how much regulation is needed when a market failure
presents itself-i.e. when a constraint "prevents the attainment of one of the
Paretian conditions' for Pareto's optimum to be achieved. 213 The TSB
establishes that, where market imperfections occur in any market, the
equilibrium conditions could be subject to change in all markets.21 4 In such
a scenario, imperfections could be eliminated with intervention via
regulation. The TSB thus justifies regulatory intervention, for it could
restore the lost equilibrium in a specific market. In the case of the
European Union's regulatory framework for the distribution of cars, price
differentials reflect the existence of market imperfections, and the TSB
would justify the existence of the specific regulation.
In practice, some flaws can be detected in this theory. The main
problem appears to be how to define with precision what the perfect level of
regulatory intervention should be in all markets. In this sense, this theory
alone does not seem to serve as a sufficient explanation for the existence of
Regulation 1400/2002. Furthermore, modem regulatory theory reaches
somewhat different conclusions on the role and necessity of sectoral
regulation, based on approximation and general presumption.2 " This
involves the "cost-benefit" ranking of regulatory policies based on their
potential for realising Kaldor-Hicks ("KH") efficiency improvements, on
which modem law and economics in the U.S. is entirely based.216 The
210 This argument is stressed in Car Retailing: Driving a Hard Bargain, ECONOMIST, Jan.
26, 2002.
211 Id.
212 Although originally formulated by Meade, see JAMES E. MEADE, TRADE AND
WELFARE (1955), the general definition of the TSB can be found in Richard G. Lipsey &
Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 R. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956).
213 Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 21.
214 See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND POLICY 234-35 (1994).
215 See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, The Case for "Business as Usual" in Law-and-
Economics Land: A Critical Comment, 78 IOWA L.R. 387 (1993).
216 Edward Stringham, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central Planning, 4
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Kaldor-Hicks criterion has long been the standard for cost-benefit
analysis, 21 7 and American judges-including Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit-believe in using it to reach a decision on the cases presented
before them.
218
A Ki- improvement is defined as a change that is either a Pareto
improvement-that is, where at least one participant would be better off as
a result of a change and no participant would be worse off-or "such that
the 'winners' from the change would be able to compensate the 'losers' and
still be better off, and the 'losers' could not afford to bribe the 'winners' to
prevent the change., 219 This would lead to a state of the world in which no
new allocation of resources could be made whereby those made better-off
could hypothetically fully compensate those made worse-off, and still be
better-off. In such a context, the potential welfare costs of inefficient
sectoral regulation are clear. If regulators attempt to correct market failures
via a particular form of regulation, but fail to do so or in fact create greater
market failures in other markets, regulatory intervention may be suboptimal
and may cause more harm than it intends to correct. The TSB suggests that
the scope for suboptimal intervention is very considerable, given that any
intervention in one market will typically affect the equilibrium conditions in
a wide array of other markets.
Any regulatory system, for example, has both administrative costs and
error costs. Administrative costs occur when industry participants seek to
influence regulatory intervention in their favor, for instance by lobbying or
pursuing litigation. Error costs, on the other hand, are the result of incorrect
regulatory decisions, and could imply either allowing an anti-competitive
conduct or prohibiting a pro-competitive one. According to KH, an optimal
regulatory system would be a system that minimizes such costs while
promoting transparency and accountability, thus reducing the ability for
governments to misuse regulation to favor particular firms and industries
for their political self-interest. In competition policy, the optimal regulatory
system should also minimize the possibility for regulatory error by
complementing the competitive process rather than hindering it. These
factors would raise doubts about the car sector regulation. First, the
outstanding influence of the industry's lobby could be the cause for the
stricter conditions in place which are beneficial mostly to manufacturers.
Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 41 (2001).
217 Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); see also John R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social
Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105 (1940).
218 Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000).
219 Reckon Open, Pareto Improvements and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Criterion, http:
//www.reckon.co.uk/open/Pareto-improvements-and Kaldor-Hicks-efficiencycriterion
(last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
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The last regulation has somewhat restored that balance, but the influence of
the industry is still palpable. Second, as regards error costs, it is likely that,
by establishing market share thresholds which apply almost regardless of
the specific circumstances of each case, 22° it is likely that some potentially
beneficial distribution agreements are being struck down, while other more
harmful accords could qualify for an exemption. The per se illegality of
certain types of clauses, enumerated in Article 4 of Regulation
1400/2002, 21 could bear the same effect.
The KR test, however, remains inconclusive for our purposes, and in
recent times its validity as a comprehensive guide to policy development
has been questioned.22  In particular, it seems to forget the importance of
other considerations beyond efficiency, such as equity, and seems only
well-defined in terms of the "local optimum" and not for larger changes.
Therefore, direct regulation is still perceived by some as the best way to
reduce error costs and diminish administrative costs.224 Modem theory of
industrial organization suggests therefore that as a general presumption, the
more competitive a market, the more efficient that market will be. This
presumption suggests a positive correlation between competition and
market efficiency and indicates a role for governments in directly
promoting competition to offset market failures associated with imperfect
competition. Accordingly, such theories and general presumptions
collectively establish the theoretical justification of modem competition law
and its objective of promoting competition to increase economic efficiency.
In the case of regulation affecting the car sector, the KH test poses
serious questions about its efficiency. However, it is not the only criterion
relevant and one must not forget any other implications. It is necessary to
explore further to see if there are any other justifications that may serve to
sustain the need for specific regulation. For that, the next part looks at
economic theory to find justifications and criticisms of car price
differentials.225
220 However, this is with the exception of those agreements which contain one of the
black clauses contained in Article 4 of the Regulation. Regulation 1400/2002, supra note 9.
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., Stringham, supra note 216; KOMESAR, supra note 15.
223 Reckon Open, supra note 219.
224 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, in
TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH (Jagdish Bhagwati et al. eds., 1971); Harold
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
225 For a detailed look of the regulation/competition dichotomy in the sector of
telecommunications, see Paul Nihoul, Convergence in European Telecommunications: A
Case Study on the Relationship Between Regulation and Competition (Law), 2 INT'L J.
COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (1998-99).
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E. Economic Justifications for the Condemnation of Price Differentials
Economic analysis also needs to be considered in order to evaluate just
how much of a concern price differentials are from the perspective of
competition policy. Motta illustrates the potential problems for competition
with an example:
Suppose that a monopolist (but the same arguments can be made to
any firm enjoying some market power) sells the same product in two
different countries, say Germany and Portugal; assume also that
transportation costs are nil, for simplicity. In Germany there exists a
higher intensity of demand for the good than in Portugal, which can
be thought of as reflecting the higher German incomes. If the
monopolist is allowed to price discriminate, it will set a higher price
in Germany, say p , than in Portugal, say pp. (Of course, it will be
able to enforce this price difference only if it can prevent consumers
and intermediaries from exploiting arbitrage opportunities. For
instance, if it forbids Portuguese buyers to re-sell outside their home
country.)
Suppose instead that price discrimination is prohibited by law. One
would then expect the new uniform price, pU, to be located
somewhere in between pD and pp, if the firm wants to serve both
markets. What is the effect on welfare of imposing the same price
across countries? A priori, it is ambiguous: profits decrease (as the
firm is not able to exploit the different intensities in demand),
Germans would gain (since they buy at a price pu lower than pD) and
Portuguese would lose (the new price pU is higher than pP).
Nevertheless,... aggregating losses and gains, overall welfare
increases when banning grice discrimination if both markets are
served under both regimes.
226
This would, in principle, support the Commission's concerns about car
price differentials. However, there are other factors that need to be taken
into consideration. F or instance, it raises some equity concerns, since, as
Motta points out, higher income consumers are better off and lower income
consumers are worse off from the prohibition of price discrimination.227
Also, it could be that the firm in question, if it cannot price discriminate,
might find it more Rrofitable to stop serving the Portuguese market, or to set
the higher price p for both markets even if it loses its sales in Portugal.
That might be the case if the demand in Portugal is limited compared to that
226 MOTrA, supra note 13, at 495-96.
227 Id. at 496.
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in Germany, or if the market in the former is much smaller than in the
latter.228  In such a case, "banning price discrimination is clearly
detrimental: it reduces the profits of the firm, reduces Portuguese consumer
surplus. and leaves the German consumer surplus unchanged., 229 Using the
scenario of the pharmaceutical industry's supply of drugs to the South
African market, Fox provides us with another example that further clarifies
the problems associated with banning price differentials:
We might enthusiastically applaud the commitment of Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Hoffmann-La-Roche, and
Boehringer Ingelheim to provide South Africa with their anti-AIDS
drugs at lowest rates available anywhere in the world. (I do). But if
distributors in South Africa can ship those drugs to the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Germany, undermining the market that
pays back total costs, there will be no low-priced drugs for South
Africa after the very short term.
2 30
The economic analysis raises further doubts about the adequacy of
prohibiting manufacturers from price differentiating. Theory would suggest
that it would be economically beneficial for consumers. However, in
practice this is not always the case. This is further emphasized by the fact
that price discrimination can have longer term dynamic effects on welfare,
as it can act as an incentive to invest. Again, Motta's work provides an
illustrative scenario:
Suppose that a firm has to decide whether to introduce a new product
in the EU or not, and that the cost of developing and launching the
product is independent of output .... Since price discrimination
allows the firm to have higher profits, if the fixed cost falls between
the price discrimination and the uniform pricing profits, then the
product will be introduced if the firm expects to be able to prevent
parallel imports, but will not be introduced if price discrimination
practices were outlawed. More generally, price discrimination can
affect the marginal profits from investing or innovating, creating
more incentives to engage in such activities.
231
The European case law proves this tendency, in particular relating to
the pharmaceutical sector. A number of companies have been fined by the
228 Id.
229 Id.; see also Case 30/78, Distillers Co. v. Comm'n, 1980 E.C.R. 2229 (where the
whisky manufacturer Johnny Walker stopped selling outside the United Kingdom as a result
of the prohibition imposed by both the Commission and the ECJ to price discriminate
between the United Kingdom and the continental market-the latter being cheaper).
230 Fox, supra note 181, at 986.
231 MOTTA, supra note 13, at 496-97.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:35 (2007)
Commission for preventing their representatives in cheaper Member State
from selling the product in those countries with higher prices. The Bayer
and Glaxo/Wellcome cases are good examples. 232 In 1996, Bayer was fined
for reducing supplies of a drug to French and Spanish wholesalers that had
been re-exporting to the United Kingdom, where the price for the drug was
higher. The Advocate General of the case did however express the view
that forbidding parallel trade need not necessarily be per se anti-
competitive, as had been upheld until then. The decision was later annulled
by the CFI for a formality-the Court found no agreement where Bayer
merely allocated the supply of its product to its distributors in a unilateral
effort to prevent arbitrage. 33  This seems to reflect certain tolerance
towards the manufacturer's practice of forbidding parallel trade.
Nevertheless, five years later, in Glaxo/Wellcome, a dual pricing system
was considered to fall within the scope of the 81 (1) EC prohibition.2 4 By
virtue of the scheme set up by Glaxo/Wellcome, Spanish wholesalers were
charged a higher price for supplies which were to be re-sold abroad than
those aimed at the local market, since it was proven that this practice had
effectively impeded parallel trade. 35
In this scenario, the majority seems to believe, as the author, that price
discrimination and the ability of a producer to segment its own markets can
indeed be the means to increase output and sell more products, rather than
to restrain trade. Indeed, if a firm is not able to price discriminate, the firm
may not be able or interested to serve the lowest priced market. 6 This
leads Fox to conclude that
[T]he problem is not about freeing trade, but controlling or
subsidizing price. The EC rules on internal-market exhaustion on
parallel imports are ad hoc tools, dependent upon fortuities, by which
government can sometimes put a lid on price without calling the
intervention price control. The EC exhaustion and competition rules
would import into all of the EU the price regulation of the Member
State that suppresses the price the most. But, of course, one hundred
percent success would mean one hundred percent failure: the market
232 Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 1I-.3383; Commission Decision
2001/791, 2001 O.J. (L 302) 1 (EC) (relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the
EC Treaty, including Glaxo Wellcome and others).
233 See Valentine Korah, "Consent" in Relation to Curbs of Parallel Trade in Europe, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 972, 974-78 (2001-2002).
234 Commission Decision 2001/791, supra note 232, at 978.
235 Id.
236 See Michel Waelbroeck, Price Discrimination and Rebate Policies Under EU
Competition Law, 1995 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 147 (1996); see also Distillers Co. v.
Comm'n, 1980 E.C.R 2229.




Summing up, the economics of price discrimination seem to question
the per se prohibition of forbidding parallel imports under competition law
that the Commission defends. Evidence suggests that low income
consumers could end up paying more if prices were harmonized, and there
is a danger that some markets will cease being served unless manufacturers
are not allowed to price discriminate and forbid parallel imports. In the car
sector, there does not seem to be an initiative for firms to stop serving the
cheaper national markets. Manufacturers have frequently put into practice
systems to prevent the flow of parallel imports and to avoid cross-border
sales. In the future, this practice might encourage manufacturers to stop
serving those markets where their cars are less popular and are sold at
cheaper prices if they cannot prevent their dealers in these territories from
selling in other more expensive countries. In such a context, the
overwhelming concern for price differentials in the car sector can be
questioned, as can the existence of specific sectoral regulation for
distribution in the automobile industry.
V. THE EUROPEAN CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE
This study would not be complete without taking into consideration
consumer preferences when it comes to purchasing a brand new vehicle. In
order to accurately estimate the potential impact of price transparency and
regulation on price, it is necessary to know just how important it is for
consumers to pay less for their vehicles, and how aware they are of the
possibilities EC competition law gives them. With this purpose, an
examination of the data available in some of the studies and surveys
available has been carefully developed. Moreover, the author felt the need
to investigate deeper by conducting a survey in three Member States, as
well as one-on-one interviews in various EU countries.
An optimum point of departure for our purposes is provided by the
study carried out by AC Nielsen referred to earlier.2 38 It reflected that one
in every four European drivers was considering changing automobile within
a year.239 This implies that there is a high demand for cars within the
European Union, where the survey shows that consumers tend to prefer
local (European) brands. Although Toyota is the worldwide bestseller,
Volkswagen and Peugeot are the favorites among consumers in the
European Union. More specifically, the study reflects that nationals from
those Member States with leading national carmakers (in particular
237 Fox, supra note 181, at 986.
238 ACNielsen, supra note 148.
239 Id. (34% of Italians are thinking of changing cars, while 32% of the French and 30%
of the Spanish are expected to do the same.)
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Germany, Italy, and France) have a preference for their national product.24 °
This study therefore seems to suggest that European consumers are still
loyal to the big European carmakers, which should a priori imply a better
prospectus for the industry than would be expected given the problems it
currently has to face. 24' However, the survey also provided information on
the factors that impact the European consumer when choosing a motor
vehicle. Safety and design were among the top priorities, but the most
influential factor across the globe was price.242 Therefore, if European
manufacturers maintain their advantageous position in Europe and wish to
do well in the rest of the world, they need to keep their prices low. This
evidently exerts a lot of pressure on the manufacturers, and even more so
considering that Asian newcomers to the industry are predicted to enter the
market with highly competitive prices.
The information provided by this survey proves useful for our
purposes, but unanswered gaps remain. For instance, we still ignore the
question of whether or not consumers actually have information about price
differentials, and if so, to what extent those consumers in the most
expensive Member States are willing to go across the border to purchase
their vehicles. By investigating in this direction, it will be possible to
determine the practical consequences of the Commission's fight against car
price differentials and the protection of parallel imports. In addition,
information regarding consumer preferences pertaining to distribution
channels, sales, and after-sales services is essential. To this end, we use
data gathered from two principal sources: a study undertaken by Dr.
Lademann & Partner in 1996 on behalf of the Commission on consumer
preferences in automobile distribution (the "Lademann Study"),2 43 and the
results of my own investigations, materialized in a survey carried out in
three Member States in early 2006, and a series of interviews with
randomly selected consumers across the European Union.
Given the five year gap between the two surveys, any possible changes
in consumer preferences over this period should be reflected. Most
importantly, the impact of Regulation 1400/2002 should also show in our
findings, as they provide us with reliable data of the situation before and
after its entry into force.
240 Id. (Volkswagen was a leading brand in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and
Sweden, while Fiat was a clear market leader in Italy, and Citroen and Peugeot in France.)
241 Id.; see also supra Part III.B.
242 Id. (In the United States and Asia, performance was also among the top priorities.)
243 European Commission, DG COMP, Customer Preferences for Existing and Potential
Sales and Servicing Alternatives in Automotive Distribution, (Dec. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Lademann Study] (prepared by Rainer P. Lademann), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition
/car_sector/di'tribution/eval reg_1475_95/studies/customer preferences.pdf.
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A. Consumer Preferences When Purchasing a New Motor Vehicle
With the purpose of estimating consumers' acceptance of different
sales and servicing alternatives, 244 the Lademann Study surveyed around
100 consumers randomly in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and
the United Kingdom. The choice of countries responds to an attempt to
find a balance with respect to geography and size of these Member States.
For similar reasons, the survey carried out by the author focused on three of
these countries: Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Germany was
chosen for being one of the most expensive Euroland markets for new cars,
and it was complaints from German customers who were refused by Italian
dealers when trying to purchase their cars cross-border which started the
Commission's investigation leading to the infamous Volkswagen case.2 45
As regards Spain, it is traditionally one of the markets where prices are
lower, and it has also adopted the single currency. Finally, the United
Kingdom has the highest car prices in Europe and has remained outside the
EMU. Three hundred questionnaires were handed out to people in these
countries ensuring that people with different cultural and economic
backgrounds, as well as from different regions of each of the selected
Member States were adequately represented. The response was
overwhelming: nearly 85 percent of the questionnaires handed out in Spain
were returned, over 70 percent of the ones carried out in the United
Kingdom and nearly 65 percent for Germany. On the basis of these replies,
some conclusions can be drawn about consumer preferences.
Our study shows that people in the United Kingdom tend to change
cars more often, while Spanish people normally hang on to their vehicles
for five to ten years (and even more than that in 20 percent of cases!). The
results for Germany suggest that in this Member State people change cars
more often, as 55 percent said they changed cars in less than five years. It
seems that in the United Kingdom, people tend to purchase new cars-just
under 72 percent of consumers had bought brand new vehicles-whereas in
Spain almost 48 percent of the people surveyed declared owning a second-
hand car or were thinking of buying one. More particularly, our survey
shows that about 12 percent of Spanish consumers go across the border to
buy second-hand cars, Germany being the preferred country of purchase.
The reason for this seems to be that in Spain people use their vehicles for
over ten years, whereas the Germans usually resell them within five years.
The long use the Spanish give their vehicles means that second-hand cars in
Spain tend to be very old, and therefore those wishing to buy a second hand
car go to Germany, where cars are resold in a better condition and at
competitive prices. Going cross-border is not as common for brand new
244 Id. at 5.
245 Commission Decision 2001/711, supra note 6.
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cars, as only 2 percent had considered buying their new vehicles abroad.
This can be easily understood since Spain is one of the cheapest markets in
the European Union, with some of the lowest pre-tax prices. As for
Germany, over 75 percent of consumers opt for new vehicles.
Up to 20 percent of British consumers proved to be willing to buy their
cars abroad, which shows a certain awareness of the high level of prices in
that Member State. Still, only about 5 percent had actually done so.
However, according to the Lademann Study, it seems that about 10 percent
of UK drivers buy their cars from a re-importer.246 Hence, parallel imports
seem to be relatively frequent, particularly compared to other Member
States. Re-importers are virtually nonexistent in Spain given the low price
level, and about 95 percent of cars are bought through authorized dealers.247
Our survey further showed that about 65 percent of consumers purchased
their cars from their nearest concessionary, while 30 percent went to
cheaper national regions where prices were lower.248  In Germany,
authorized dealers are the most popular choice, with over 90 percent of
sales. Re-imports do exist, and about 5 percent of consumers buy their cars
from a re-importer. The Lademann Study also reflects that, curiously, it is
in France where most cars are sold by distribution chains other than
branches of the manufacturer and authorized dealers. Almost 20 percent of
sales are carried out by re-importers and, most importantly, retail chains.249
Internet sales of cars are still uncommon, especially when compared to
online sales of other products. In the United Kingdom, 80 percent of
consumers seem to shop around for the best price and as many as 75
percent check online prices before the final purchase. In Spain, the Internet
is used less frequently, and the main purpose of using it is to obtain
information about the characteristics of the car they are thinking of
purchasing, rather than price (only 11 percent have done that) or even less
with the purpose of actually purchasing their cars online (4 percent had
contemplated the possibility). Only two people in Germany had actually
purchased a car online, and expressed satisfaction with the purchase. When
asked if, in the future, they would consider purchasing their cars online,
only 15 percent of Spanish consumers said they might do so, while 16
percent of Germans and 23 percent of British consumers were willing to do
so. Most of those consumers were among the youngest interviewed.
246 Lademann Study, supra note 243, at 32. Our own results also reflected such a
preference, as 97 percent of the consumers surveyed had purchased their cars in a
concessionary.
247 Id. The remainder are sold in the manufacturers' branches.
248 Id. This was the case mainly for those consumers interviewed who resided in Madrid
but were originally from other areas of Spain.
249 id.
250 See Maier, supra note 27.
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Therefore, it is likely that, within the next ten years or so, Internet sales will
become more and more common, particularly once younger generations
whose lifetime coincides with the Internet era begin to drive.
As far as loyalty to European brands is concerned, our study showed
that, for the time being, European brands are indeed the favorites,
particularly in Germany and Spain. Up to 55 percent of the people
surveyed in this country chose European manufacturers-mainly
Volkswagen, Audi, and Peugeot. Even so, when asked if they would
consider switching to extra-Communitarian cars, up to 40 percent said they
would consider on the basis of price and quality. In the United Kingdom,
over 18 percent already have a car that is not European. Toyota, Honda,
and Nissan are the main rivals of European manufacturers in this market.
Again, price and quality were highlighted as crucial when choosing which
car to buy. In Germany, the favorite manufacturer is the Volkswagen-Audi
group.251 It is mainly those who have just bought their first vehicle who go
for Japanese cars, and those who already own a European car tend to remain
faithful. Luxury cars, such as Mercedes and top Audi models, show the
largest loyalty rates. These results therefore are very similar to those of the
252ACNielsen survey.
To further illustrate how consumers prefer to purchase their vehicles,
twenty-five personal interviews were conducted across the European Union
with consumers based mainly in Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Belgium, and Poland. These interviews reflect that it is mainly the
Germans and the British who think of buying their cars abroad. Italy is the
main choice for the German consumers, while Belgium and Denmark are
the United Kingdom's favorite. Two of the people interviewed in the
United Kingdom had actually purchased their cars in Belgium. One of
them had experienced a problem in doing so, as the dealer originally
seemed to be reluctant to sell to UK consumers. The consumer threatened
to take the case to the Commission, and eventually he was able to purchase
his car. In this sense, the threat of the possibility of going to the
Commission seemed to have an effect on the dealer. Even so, this case was
the only one we came across, and most consumers were happy to avoid the
hassles of buying abroad even if it meant paying higher prices. A general
interest in buying cars online in the future was expressed, but only five
reflected a thorough knowledge of the websites where it is possible to do
so.
251 The VW group comprises some of the leading firms such as Volkswagen, Audi,
Skoda, Bentley, Lamborghini, and SEAT. See Volkswagen, Other Companies,
http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/content/en/brands-and-companies/other-com
panies.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
252 See ACNielsen, supra note 148.
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B. Estimations
On the basis of these findings, a series of deductions can be made.
The Commission's action can be held partially responsible for opening up
cross-border sales. It seems that manufacturers are reluctant to allow
consumers to shop in Member States other than their country of residence
for their cars, and the threat of facing a big fine has proven effective in
some cases. Even so, only a small proportion of consumers show an
awareness of this possibility, and even less expressed an interest in going to
another Member State to benefit from lower prices. Price convergence, as
reflected by recent figures, is possibly driven to a greater extent by the high
degree of competition in the market, and in particular the pressure posed by
Japanese carmakers, who look set to increase their sales in the European
Union among first-time buyers, if they maintain their very competitive
prices. The Internet has also played a crucial role and will continue to do so
in future years. Currently, the Web is providing consumers with accurate
price information and the possibility to check and compare prices across
territories of one country and the entire European Union. Within the next
decade, Internet sales could gradually become more frequent among the
new generations of drivers who have a high degree of confidence in online
shopping. This should, in principle, lessen the effect of national borders in
price differentials, even if studies of the prices on the Internet for different
products still reflect cross-border differences. It will also exert a lot of
pressure on car manufacturers and may, in the long run, alter the structure
of the European car market and the way cars are distributed across Europe.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The steady decrease in price differentials in the car sector is a
consequence of a convergence of circumstances. The progressive process
of integration taking place in the European Union is principally responsible,
as the elimination of barriers to trade in the path towards the
implementation of the free movement of goods is eventually unifying
markets across the EC territory. Even so, and while prices can be expected
to converge further, complete integration will most likely never be achieved
given the existence of linguistic and geographical differences that make it
almost impossible. While these differences remain (more than likely
forever), price differentials are likely to exist. This "border effect" affects
not only the car sector but also other products and even those sold on the
Internet.
Other factors, however, are also pushing greater price convergence.
The improved price transparency, achieved mainly by the Internet and to a
lesser extent by the euro, is having an impact on prices. Consumers seem to
rely on the Web for comparing prices, and given its boost as a shopping
forum and the results of our survey Internet sales of cars are set to become
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increasingly popular, even if for the time being authorized dealers are still
preferred and will be unlikely to disappear. This technological revolution is
joined by a difficult situation for European car manufacturers that imposes a
duty on them to remain competitive if they do not want to lose their
position to foreign carmakers from the United States and particularly from
Asia. This pressure is likely to lead to a restructuring of the European car
market, as currently European car manufacturers are too many to survive in
a competitive worldwide market. Hence, the author's predictions for the
future are a proliferation of Internet sales in the long term, which may well
lead to a revolution in automobile distribution, and a restructuring of the car
market similar to that of the United States in the 1960s which led to the
consolidation of the "big three" as the only national manufacturers.
On the one hand, the regulatory changes introduced by the
Commission in 2002 have provided an adequate legal context for the vital
change and innovation in distribution, which the previous regime hampered.
Doubts arise, however, about whether the renewal of the block exemption
was the most favorable way of achieving these changes. The KH efficiency
test shows some costs which may question the efficiency of this specific
and stricter regime for car distribution. On the other hand, the
Commission's concerns about protecting parallel imports and the freedom
to buy anywhere else have had some beneficial results for consumers, as
some of them have indeed been able to buy their cars from dealers in other
Member States. The Commission's hostile view of price discrimination and
its consequential de facto prohibition of the phenomenon by defending
parallel imports have, in this regard, undoubtedly pushed price
convergence. However, our analysis has proved that important mid- to
long-term problems can be derived from parallel trade which cannot be
overlooked. In the long run, prices could end up being higher in countries
where consumers are worse off, or certain markets could stop being served
altogether. Besides, the Commission's action and regulatory activity
increases the burden on manufacturers, who not only have to comply with
regulation regarding safety standards, environment and product
requirements, but also with sector-specific competition rules for their
franchising agreements with their dealers. It is therefore far from clear that
the law can provide an adequate means of controlling these differentials,
and even more dubious is the fact that it should. An analysis of economic
theory behind price discrimination raises serious doubts about its per se
illegality, and urge for a reconsideration.
The author would like to leave the reader with a quote from Fox that
sums up the dilemma. "One need not conclude.., that granting freedom to
producers who act unilaterally is the prescription that serves the interests of
the world. If one cares about the distribution of resources (as opposed
merely to efficient allocation), it is not. However, the above analysis might
cause us to rethink whether the unilateral use of vertical restraints is the
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problem and whether government proscription of vertical restraints is the
cure." 253 Food for thought.
253 Fox, supra note 181, at 986.
